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ABSTRACT
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mail attack have
forced health care administrators and policy makers to place a new emphasis on disaster planning
at hospital facilities—specifically bioterrorism planning. Yet how does one truly “prepare” for
the unpredictable? In spite of accreditation requirements, which demand hospitals put in to place
preparations to deal with bioterrorism events, a recent study from the General Accounting Office
(GAO) concluded that most hospitals are still not capable of dealing with such threats (Gonzalez,
2004). This dissertation uses computer simulation modeling to test the effectiveness of
bioterrorism planning at a local hospital facility in Central Florida, Winter Park Memorial
Hospital. It is limited to the response plan developed by the hospital’s Emergency Department. It
evaluates the plan’s effectiveness in dealing with an inhalational anthrax attack. Using Arena
computer simulation software, and grounded within the theoretical framework of Complexity
Science, we were able to test the effectiveness of the response plan in relation to Emergency
Department bed capacity. Our results indicated that the response plan’s flexibility was able to
accommodate an increased patient load due to an attack, including an influx of the “worried
well.” Topics of future work and study are proposed.

iii

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Gene and Clare Bebber, who instilled in me the
value of education and challenged me to never stop learning.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation would not have been possible without the friendship and guidance of
Aaron Liberman, my chair, mentor, and good friend. He remains my strongest supporter and I
am eternally grateful for his wise counsel and advice over these past few years. My dissertation
committee of Dr. Thomas Wan, Dr. Ken Adams, and Dr. Ning Zhang were also valuable in
helping me throughout this process. I am also thankful to Carl Anglesea, MS CMSP, a doctoral
student at the U.C.F. Institute for Simulation and Training, who assisted me in developing the
model of the Winter Park Memorial Hospital Emergency Department. I am also in debt to Dr.
Duane Steward, a professor in the College of Health and Public Affairs, who introduced me to
computer simulation modeling and its application in disaster planning. Finally, I am grateful to
Winter Park Memorial Hospital (FL) and especially Barb Gable, MA BSN CEN, Director of
Emergency Services and Diane Sullivan, ANM BSN who provided me with the data and insight
into the response planning at WPMH.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................... x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1
Introduction................................................................................................................................. 1
Analyzing the Threat................................................................................................................... 5
CHAPTER TWO: SIMULATION IN HEALTH CARE, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
OPERATIONS, AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE.............................................................................................................................. 12
Emergency Department Operations.......................................................................................... 12
Cost-Benefit Analysis ............................................................................................................... 16
Physician Staffing ..................................................................................................................... 19
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)........................................................................................ 22
Hospital Processes .................................................................................................................... 25
Health Care Organization Optimization ................................................................................... 27
Bioterrorism Preparedness ........................................................................................................ 32
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 38
Statement of Theoretical Context ............................................................................................. 38
Research Design........................................................................................................................ 48
Winter Park Memorial Hospital: Bioterrorism Response Plan and Mass Casualty/Disaster Plan
................................................................................................................................................... 55
Building a Model of the Winter Park Memorial Hospital Emergency Department ................. 60
Validating the Model ................................................................................................................ 68
vi

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS.................................................................................................... 82
Inhalational Anthrax Attack...................................................................................................... 82
Emergency Department Bed Capacity...................................................................................... 84
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................. 91
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 91
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 92
Future Work .............................................................................................................................. 93
APPENDIX A: EVALUATION OF BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE PLAN: DISCRETE
EVENT MODEL DESCRIPTION AND VALIDATION............................................................ 97
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO SPECULATION.............................................. 108
LIST OF REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 110

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Transnational Terrorist Networks (State, 2003).............................................................. 7
Figure 2: Operationalizing the Strategy (State, 2003) .................................................................... 8
Figure 3: Perrow's Framework of Complexity ............................................................................. 41
Figure 4: Modeling and Simulation Process, Adapted from Pritsker and O’Reilly (1999).......... 50
Figure 5: Emergency Department Process.................................................................................... 54
Figure 6: Model Logic .................................................................................................................. 61
Figure 7: Patient Generation Process............................................................................................ 63
Figure 8: Patient Arrival Process .................................................................................................. 64
Figure 9: Patient Processing.......................................................................................................... 66
Figure 10: Patient Disposition ...................................................................................................... 67
Figure 11: Emergency Department Animation............................................................................. 68
Figure 12: Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month (January)..................................................... 70
Figure 13: Patient Visits/Hour (January 2006) ............................................................................. 71
Figure 14: Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month (May).......................................................... 73
Figure 15: Patient Visits/Hour (May 2006) .................................................................................. 74
Figure 16: Model Patient Arrival Condition Example 1............................................................... 77
Figure 17: Model Patient Arrival Condition Example 2............................................................... 78
Figure 18: Patient Admission Example 1 ..................................................................................... 79
Figure 19: Patient Admission Example 1a (Magnified) ............................................................... 80
Figure 20: Advance Warning Scenario—May Patient Load ........................................................ 85
Figure 21: Advance Warning Scenario—January Patient Load ................................................... 86
Figure 22: Emergent Discovery Scenario—May Patient Load .................................................... 88
viii

Figure 23: Emergent Discovery Scenario—January Patient Load ............................................... 89

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Guidelines for Preparing Health Care Organizations for Bioterrorism .......................... 47
Table 2: Actual vs. Model Data .................................................................................................... 69
Table 3: Modeled Typical January Arrivals ................................................................................. 72
Table 4: Modeled Typical May Arrivals ...................................................................................... 75

x

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Introduction
America must know that the battle will not leave its land, God willing, until America
leaves our land, until it stops supporting Israel, until it stops the blockade [now
occupation] against Iraq. Osama bin Laden, 19981
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mail attack have
forced health care administrators and policy makers to place a new emphasis on disaster planning
at hospital facilities – specifically bioterrorism planning. This was followed by an emphasis from
federal policy makers on preparations for a bioterrorist attack in the form of the introduction of
smallpox into a community. Reinforcing this emphasis on bioterrorism preparedness were
outbreaks of new, natural diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory syndrome (SARS) and
avian flu (H5N1). Yet how does one truly “prepare” for the unpredictable? In spite of
accreditation requirements which demand hospitals put in to place preparations to deal with
bioterrorism events, a recent study from the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that
most hospitals are still not capable of dealing with such threats (Gonzalez, 2004). No doubt
there are many factors contributing to hospital unpreparedness, notwithstanding the still present
issues that existed prior to 2001 (declining reimbursement from government and private third
party payers, the growing number of the uninsured, consumer driven health plans, etc.) and still
affect hospitals today.
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Statement, translated by the Associated Press, October 9th, 2001, available at
http://users.skynet.be/terrorism/html/laden_statement.htm and accessed August 30th, 2006
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Health care components of disaster preparedness have received haphazard treatment. It is
generally assumed that the locus of the health care response to a mass-casualty event will be the
local hospital facility or facilities. These facilities, however, have been under increasing financial
pressures from other societal problems, namely the growing number of uninsured Americans
seeking care while reimbursement rates from federal and state social insurance programs and
private managed care companies have been declining.
America’s health care system faces a unique set of challenges. Increasing systemic costs
associated with rising health insurance premiums, new technologies, and greater demand coupled
with planned reductions in Medicare and Medicaid expenditures, results in dwindling resources.
Since 2001, there have been annual, double-digit increases in health insurance premiums for
firms with 200 or more employees, with an additional 11.4 percent increase projected for 2004
(Kaiser/HRET, 2004). By 2013, national health expenditures are expected to rise to $3.3 billion,
or 18.4% of Gross National Product (Heffler et al, 2004).
Hospitals are not immune. They are under pressure for cost transparency from consumers
and regulators. There is a powerful movement toward improved quality of service delivery and
patient safety. Expectations from patients that newly introduced technologies will be available
put upward pressure on expenses. At the same time, managed care companies have continued to
slow their rates of reimbursement, while pharmaceutical companies drive drug prices higher and
higher. Governments are placing greater regulatory burdens on hospitals, along with
accreditation agencies. While hospitals are facing significant workforce shortages in states such
as Florida, they continue to see a greater number of patients with severe, chronic conditions
(FHA, 2004).
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Hospitals are also expected to bear a greater fiscal burden for social problems. For
example, in Florida, the number of non-elderly uninsured rose to 2.9 million (EBRI, 2004). The
percent of Floridians who have employer-based health insurance declined to 57 percent in 2003,
down from a high of 61.1% in 2000 (EBRI, 2003). The total cost of uncompensated care
provided by Florida hospitals went from $1.2 billion in 1998 to $1.5 billion in 2002 (AHCA,
2003). This burden is as a result of federally mandated care provided through the “Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act” or EMTALA.
In fact, hospitals in the United States are being compared to the plight of major American
airlines. The similarities are striking. “Both comprise companies that built a complex
infrastructure and provided cross-subsidized services.” Cross-subsidized services are necessary
for hospitals since a great deal of the services they provide are not paid for. Hospitals provide
care to Medicare and Medicaid patients under costs (i.e., they receive less in reimbursement than
it costs to care for those patients). In the emergency care setting, hospitals are required to provide
care regardless of a patient’s ability to pay. In the past, hospitals were able to make up for these
losses because of the lack of price transparency and price sensitivity on the part of insurers. This
is similar to the airline industry, which was created on a “fly anyone to everywhere” principle.
An airline was able to receive less than costs to fly some people some places, because it could
make up for it on other routes. Price transparency and low-cost airlines have nearly eliminated
the ability of airlines to cross-subsidize, forcing some of the major carriers into bankruptcy or
near bankruptcy. In much the same way that general airlines such as Delta or U.S. Air may
become a thing of the past, so too may general hospitals that cannot compete with the growing
number of specialty facilities who are under no obligation to provide the same level of care in all
circumstances (Altman, et al, 2006).
3

Operating in this environment, hospitals are expected to prepare contingency plans to
serve as a primary responder to, and sometimes sentinel of, bioterrorist attack. Planning for these
potential inevitabilities can be exceedingly difficult, as facilities must balance the resources used
to prepare for uncertainty with the everyday realities of the changing health care market
described above.
While there has been some study of hospital preparedness issues in a macro-sense
(Aguirre et al, 2005; Braun et al, 2006; Burstein, 2006; GAO, 2003; Helde, 2006; Katz et al,
2006; Murphy, 2004; Perry & Lindell, 2006; Wetter et al, 2001), to date there has been no study
of a specific bioterrorism response plan using computer simulation modeling to attempt to judge
its effectiveness. What this dissertation proposes to do is evaluate the bioterrorism plan of a local
hospital facility in the Orlando area of Florida. The study is further limited to the response plan
developed by the hospital’s emergency department, which will be the focus of any response
effort.
As it in an evaluation of an existing plan, this dissertation is practical in nature and more
representative of a case-study. Through the use of computer simulation modeling (or discreteevent simulation) it can observe the effectiveness of the proposed strategy, show how that
strategy will affect the ability of the emergency department to function and continue to provide
emergency care services, and make recommendations on how the plan can be improved.
Simulation modeling is a powerful tool that can assist decision-makers in evaluating
current organizational systems and proposed alternatives. As with all potential tools, it is not the
final word in whether a decision is to be made. Our world is impossibly complex, and we cannot
ever hope to have all information available prior to taking any consequential action. Modeling
can hopefully open our eyes to potential problems and evaluate alternative solutions, but it is
4

only as good as the information inputted into the model and the users who program and use the
model for decision-making purposes. Ultimately, we live in a world of unknowns. We can only
attempt to mitigate those unknowns as best as possible.

Analyzing the Threat
There remains much debate on the likelihood of the use of a biological weapon by
terrorist organizations on targets in the United States. This stems from two main assumptions.
First, conventional weapons have already proven themselves as effective against targets around
the world and in America and therefore terrorist organizations would be most likely to use
proven technology rather than relying on a weapon which is more complex to use and may not
prove effective. Second, biological weapons are notoriously difficult to maintain and deploy on
the scale that a weapon of mass destruction would imply, i.e., deaths in the thousands or more
(CRS, 2004).
Part of the reasons these assumptions hold sway is that much analysis of biological
warfare is viewed through the lens of a military weapons system used primarily by a state. We
tend to think of the list of state sponsors of terrorism, compiled by the U.S. Department of State
each year, as being the nations most likely to seek development of biological and chemical
weapons in lieu of pursuing nuclear weapons. States such as Syria, Iran, Libya, North Korea and
prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Iraq, are high on the list of states suspected of pursing
these weapons systems (State, 2003).
However, terrorist organizations may be willing to forgo mass casualties in exchange for
the mass terror that the intentional release of biological agents on a civilian population would
bring. If one considers the question from an economic perspective, the “barriers to entry” for a
5

terrorist organization to manufacture and deploy a biological weapon capable of mass destruction
are high, while the probability of their effective deployment remains uncertain. However, settling
on a smaller-scale attack vastly reduces the entry cost while increases the probability of effective
use. Indeed, one need only look at the impact of the anthrax attacks subsequent to the attacks on
September 11th, 2001, delivered in the form of powder contained in letters, to see how a small
attack and limited use (22 people got sick and 5 died) can have a massive impact on the public
and the restructuring of daily life. From a cost-benefit analysis perspective, the terrorist or
terrorists who committed the acts spent very little in terms of money and resources while the
United States government and the public were forced to divert considerable funds and resources
to respond the attack (Dando, 2005).
National security and homeland security policymakers are rightly concerned about the
linkage between state actors and state sponsors with terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda.
After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Bush Administration fundamentally changed U.S. strategy
to one of pre-emption against terrorist groups and their supporters. Instead of relying on
deterrence and defensive measures to discourage attack, the logic was transformed to one of
“taking the fight to the enemy.” In response, the United States invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq
and conducts special operations around the world against number of terrorist groups. It provides
military, political and economic assistance to nations involved in fights on their own home
territory against terrorist organizations. It also uses diplomatic and economic means to isolate
nations which actively support terrorist groups and provide them safe haven (Security, 2006).
We can visualize the reach of terrorist organizations on the following chart. Figure 1
below shows the various levels on which terrorist groups operate. Some operate within a single
nation-state or area, while others have regional and global reach. Ultimately, U.S. strategy seeks
6

to reduce the impact and reach of terrorist groups to that of a local criminal problem, as shown in
the subsequent figure.

Figure 1: Transnational Terrorist Networks (State, 2003)
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Figure 2: Operationalizing the Strategy (State, 2003)
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In spite of this fundamental shift in U.S. strategy, the threat remains that terrorist
organizations will seek to inflict damage on the American homefront. Recently, Franck and
Melese (2004) used game theory to model the decision-making process that terrorist groups may
take to decide whether to employ a weapon such as anthrax. Their hypotheses were supported
by their findings which suggest that the type of organization and the “macro-technology” of
conflict (p. 369) matters. A politically motivated terrorist group, such as the Basque separatists in
Spain, is less likely to use a weapon of mass destruction as opposed to a fanatical group. Macrotechnology includes not only the countermeasures employed by the target country, but also the
diplomacy and good relations the target country maintains with its own population in relation to
the attack by the terrorist group (Franck & Melese, 2004). As an example, consider the divergent
public responses to terrorist attacks from al Qaeda in the United States and Spain. The first attack
resulted in an initial “coming together” of the population against the interests of al Qaeda and
ultimately, an American military response. The second in Spain led to the overthrow of the
Anzar government in Spain in favor of a left-wing government which promised to end Spain’s
participation in the Iraq War.
The use of biological agents in warfare dates back to antiquity. The Assyrians used rye
ergot to poison the wells of their enemies in the sixth century B.C. The Greeks used animal
corpses to infect enemy water supplies, a practice later adopted by the Romans and Persians. In
1346-1347 A.D., the Muslim Tartar, De Mussis, catapulted bubonic-plague infected corpses over
the walls of Caffa in the Russian Crimea, causing an epidemic. Defending Christian Geonese
sailors fled back to Italy, possibly bringing with them the Black Plague which caused the
infamous pandemic, leading to the death of a third of Europe’s population (Iserson, 2001).
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Biological agents do make attractive weapons. Being living organisms, they can replicate
once disseminated, so a small infection can result in significant exposure to a large population.
Illness can take time to be discovered, leading to a spread of infection and a lateness in
appropriate response. Of course, the spread of an intentionally introduced biological agent can
result in political and social upheaval and disorganization, and paralyze military operations
(Globalsecurity.org, 2007).
Due to their susceptibility to environmental degradation, stabilization and dissemination
become the important issues related to the use of biological weapons, not unlike the problems
encountered in the development of pharmaceutical products. Exposure to heat, pressure, and
natural elements, for example, can significantly degrade and render useless any potential
bioweapon. Also, deploying a bioweapon system is dependent upon other natural factors, such as
wind and rain. Yet in spite of these challenges, a single aircraft which using an aerosol generator
to deliver 1-10 micron size droplets can disperse 100 kg of anthrax over a 300 square mile area,
potentially infecting millions in an area where the population density is 10,000 people per square
kilometer. The dissemination efficiency depends on the system used, with most aerosol delivery
systems having a rate of 40 to 60 percent, while explosives are only 1 to 5 percent
(Globalsecurity.org, 2007).
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), anthrax is a disease caused by the
bacteria Bacillus anthracis which forms spores. It is actually a small, one-celled organism. There
are three types of anthrax: cutaneous (skin), inhalation (lungs), and gastrointestinal (digestive). It
is possible for humans to become infected from handling products from infected animals, or
breathing anthrax spores from infected animal products or eating undercooked meat from
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infected animals. Anthrax can also be used as a weapon, which occurred in the United States in
2001 (CDC, 2003).
Among the three types of anthrax, inhalation anthrax is the most severe. In 2001, almost
half of all cases of inhalation anthrax resulted in death. The first symptoms of inhalation anthrax
are similar to cold or flu like symptoms. They also include sore throat, mild fever and muscle
aches. Later symptoms include cough, chest discomfort, shortness of breath, tiredness, and
muscle aches. These symptoms can appear within seven days of coming in contact with all three
types of anthrax. For inhalation anthrax, these symptoms can appear within a week to up to 42
days. Early diagnosis is critical to survival, and a case of inhalation anthrax can be treated with
antibiotics, such as ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, doxycycline or penicillin (CDC, 2003).
An inhalation anthrax attack represents an attractive scenario for this model simulation. It
presents with common flu like symptoms and therefore detection of the disease is difficult. The
inhalation strain of anthrax is not contagious which simplifies the model by not requiring
additional isolation and quarantine procedures. Finally, it can easily be dispersed in a populated
area through the use of crop dusting planes.
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CHAPTER TWO: SIMULATION IN HEALTH CARE, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
OPERATIONS, AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE
Computer simulation is proving to be a useful tool in health care and hospital
management. What follows is a brief overview of literature related to the use of computer
simulation and modeling in the hospital and health care setting. We find that simulation
modeling has been used for a variety of studies, including emergency department operations
(Blake et al, 1996; Haugh, 2004; Rossetti et al, 1999; Sinreich & Marmor, 2005), cost-benefit
analysis (Anderson et al, 2002; Stahl et al, 2004), physician staffing (Dittus et al, 1996; Rossetti
et al, 1999), emergency medical services (Su & Shih, 2003), hospital processes (Kumar & Shim,
2005), and health care organization optimization (Alexopolous et al, 2001; Ashton et al, 2005;
Masterson et al, 2004; Pasin et al, 2002). More recently, we find studies using computer
simulation modeling to analyze bioterrorism preparedness issues (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003;
Buckeridge et al, 2006; Kleinman et al, 2005).

Emergency Department Operations
Noting that health care is not unlike the service industry, Sinreich and Marmor (2005),
state that “hospital managers and other health-care policy makers are being forced to search for
ways to reduce costs and improve productivity.” As they describe it, their research project aimed
to address the principles that the simulation tool be “general and flexible enough” to model many
different possible ED (emergency department) settings, that it be “intuitive and simple to use,”
and that it include “reasonable default values for many of the system parameters” (2005, p. 734).
It was hoped that by fulfilling these objectives, managers would be more willing to use
simulation as a decision-making tool.
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Examining five different hospitals, they divided facilities based on certain characteristics.
Hospital EDs were classified according to physician type (a physician trained in Emergency
Medicine or a physician trained in another specialty, such as internal medicine, surgery or
orthopedics), patient condition (acute or ambulatory) and whether the facility puts the patient
through the same process regardless of condition (separate or not separate) (2005, p. 234).
After meeting with key staff, Sinreich and Marmor had teams of students equipped with
standardized code list of the different process elements conduct time and motion studies at each
hospital. A total sample size of 16,250 elements was gathered by the teams, while patient types
were identified through interviews with senior staff. These were combined to form eight patient
types, including fast track, internal, surgical, orthopedic, trauma, walk-in surgical, walk-in
orthopedic and internal/surgical. Based on this data, the authors were able to develop a unique
process chart for each patient type at each hospital. These charts included duration of each
element in the process and the frequency of each of the connections between the different
elements. Because these process charts were very similar, the researchers finally were able to
develop a unified process chart detailing all the different elements and transitions (2005, p. 236).
Sinreich and Marmor were able to develop a general simulation model of the emergency
department that was not dependent on which of the five hospitals the patient visited, showing
that patients are better characterized by type (internal, surgical or orthopedic). They determined
the average duration of the basic elements in the patient’s process which could be used at the
default values that could “reduce the need, in some cases, for elaborate time and motion studies
in the future.” They identified the basic patient streams that triggered different processes and
developed estimation models. From this, they were able to develop a main operation screen
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illustrating the process a patient goes through in the emergency department, including the
different elements that can be adjusted to fit each patient type at each hospital (2005, p. 244).
Rossetti et al (1999) used computer simulation to determine the optimal attending
physician staffing level at the Emergency Department at the University of Virginia Medical
Center in Charlottesville, Virginia. They were able to test alternative ED attending physicianstaffing schedules and then analyze the corresponding impact on patient throughput and resource
utilization. Without having to disturb the actual system, they could evaluate the effects of
staffing, layout, resources and patient flow changes.
Due to the complexity of the information already being collected by the hospital (the
ED’s computerized patient tracking system, lab computerized databases, etc.) the data collection
effort was divided into four phases. These included a patient-visit time study (detailed
information on each stage of the patient visit, such as registration, triage, and discharge), a
service distribution time study (the amount of time providers spent providing care to patients),
the patient arrival process (walk-in, ambulance or helicopter) and transport and routing times
(time between various arrival stations and ED areas and between areas in the ED) (1999, p.
1537).
Rossetti et al then tested four alternative staffing schedules. The current staffing schedule
had one attending physician to cover the entire ED 24 hours a day, as well as one pediatric
attending physician to cover the pediatric wing and minor emergency area for twelve hours a day
(11:00 am to 11:00 pm) The first alternative was taken from input given by the ED management,
taking advantage of their specialized knowledge of the system. The second approach used was to
maintain the 8 hour double coverage shift of the current schedule, but to vary when that shift was
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scheduled. The third approach used the same logic but added a second double shift. The fourth
approach made use of variations in the patient arrivals by weekday (1999, p. 1537-1538).
All alternatives were tested using a two-stage Bonferroni Approach to conduct the
comparison. The main goal of the simulation was to select the best scheduling alternative, which
was defined as being that which “minimized the total average patient time within the ED.” Their
simulation model was able to offer a proposed staffing schedule which decreased the average
time a patient was in their ED system by 14.5 minutes per patient or 40 hours per day (1999, p.
1538-1539).
An earlier analysis of emergency room wait times was conducted by Blake, Carter, and
Richardson (1996). Their study of Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario attempted to
“determine the flow of patients through the emergency room and to identify the data elements
required to complete a quantitative analysis” (1996, p. 266). They hypothesized that patient wait
times were influenced by a shortage of scarce resources, the inability of the system to return to
normal after the arrival of an emergency case or the “queue discipline” administered in the
emergency room. The study was conducted in three phases. The first phase was a three-day field
observation of emergency room operations over different shifts. Phase II was the building and
validation of a simulation model to test the impact of hypothesized factors on patient wait times.
During Phase III, the model was extended to simulate the effect of different operating strategies
on patient wait times (1996, p. 266).
The authors noted that Phase II produced some intriguing results. Patient wait-times were
shown to be a function of the number of casualty officers available to provide care and the
amount of time they were able to provide care to patients. The authors had wondered whether the
amount of time casualty officers spent training residents would also affect patient wait times.
15

Their data showed that queue discipline had little to no effect. Since casualty officers were
proving to be the critical element in patient wait times, it was found that by reducing the number
of residents in the emergency room (thereby reducing the amount of time casualty officers are
educating residents and increasing the amount of time available for patient care) service times
may be improved (Blake et al, 1996).
Various operational scenarios were proposed by the hospital in Phase III in the hopes of
identifying a way to reduce patient wait times. The hospital decided that its role as a teaching
institution remained too valuable to the community to eliminate any resident positions. Therefore
the scenarios focused on the number and placement of available physicians to reduce wait times.
Such options explored included the creation of a “fast track” to handle “minor emergencies,” and
the diversion of patients with minor conditions from the emergency room to the hospital clinic.
Through the simulation analysis, the hospital adopted a “fast track” process, expanding its
resources and reducing patient wait times (Blake et al, 1996).

Cost-Benefit Analysis
In an era of ever-increasing financial pressures on hospitals, discrete simulation modeling
holds some promise as an effective tool to evaluate the costs and benefits of improved clinical
care for a variety of procedures. Recently, Stahl et al (2004) used computer modeling to compare
current surgical practice with a new modular system in which patient care is handed off between
two anesthesiologists, as part of the “OR [Operating Room] of the Future Project” at
Massachusetts General Hospital, a teaching facility in Boston. Surgery departments may wish to
increase patient volume to improve efficiency, but are wary of adversely affecting patient safety.
Most hospital protocols require that the anesthesiologist remain with the patient through surgery
16

and recovery, yet from a productivity perspective, this leaves the operating room and the surgeon
“idle.” The authors focused on laparoscopic cholecystectomy, analyzing the problem from
hospital and clinical staffing costs—most relevant to the organization (Stahl et al, 2004).
The authors chose to use discrete-event simulation (what this author’s research uses as
well) because it is “methodologically designed to capture flow time, waiting time, competition
for resources, and the interdependency of events providing insight into the simulated systems
dynamics” (2004, p. 462). Two models are tested. First, the current hospital practice of having
both nurses (RN) and anesthesiologists (MDA) present at anesthesia induction and accompany
the patient from induction through recovery. A new patient cannot be induced until both the RN
and MDA have finished with the current patient. This was compared to a new staffing strategy
using 2 MDAs to work in tandem. The first anesthesiologist is responsible for induction. Patient
care is then transferred to the second anesthesiologist, who is responsible for interoperative
monitoring and recovery. This handoff cannot occur unless the second anesthesiologist is free.
Process time data, length of stay data and cost data were modeled as “univariate statistical
distributions” within the model. It was analyzed from a “health care delivery system perspective”
(using hospital and health care professional staff costs) and focused on the outcome on patient
flow time, throughput, waiting time and costs (Stahl et al, 2004).
Discrete-event simulation provided the authors with a useful way to test the effectiveness
of alternative systems of care, “particularly when resource constraints and the interdependence of
events are important” (Stahl et al, 2004). The proposed staffing strategy was found to be more
effective and less expensive than the current strategy. The higher fixed costs of additional staff
were able to spread over more patients, thus reducing the total cost per patient treated (Stahl et
al, 2004).
17

Anderson et al (2002) developed a computer simulation model to predict costs and
patient outcomes of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery—one of the most common
surgical procedures conducted. While other traditional studies have provided insight into the risk
factors associated with variations in operative mortality rates, “less is known about postoperative complication rates and variations in cost” (2002, p. 103). They also point out that “very
little is known about factors that are predictive of health care quality of life following CABG
surgery” (2002, p. 103).
The authors based their model on all Medicare patients who underwent CABG operations
at Methodist Hospital in Indiana from May 1993 to March 1994. Data was collected on length of
stay, number of specialists, age, diagnosis related group (DRG), gender, whether the surgery was
a reoperation, operative status and the cardiovascular surgeon who performed the operation.
Hospital charges and physician charges were also collected, providing complete data for 173
patients (Anderson et al, 2002).
The researchers used a systems dynamics model which uses stack-and-flow diagrams to
describe the system’s structure. The diagram symbols have definitions associated with them
which describe the quantitative relationship that exist among the various model components.
Four subsystems were included in the model. The first subsystem generates patients according to
a Monte Carlo distribution and assigned a set of preoperative characteristics. In the next
subsystem, patients are assigned to one of the five cardiovascular surgeons. Surgeons will vary in
their use of specialists and hospital resources. In the third subsystem, patients are hospitalized for
treatment and preoperative and postoperative length of stays is modeled with conveyors. Transit
times vary and are a function of patient characteristics, the specific surgeon, and the number of
specialists who consult for patient care. Finally, the fourth subsystem—the outcomes subsystem
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– use data from the other three subsystems to generate patient costs and outcomes (Anderson et
al, 2002).
Through their simulation work, the authors were able to determine that gender played an
important role in predicting length of stay and patient costs. Female patients were hospitalized
longer, thereby incurring more charges. They also tended to have poorer postoperative quality of
life, which may be a result of being diagnosed at a later stage in the disease life. Age was also a
significant factor in length of stay, patient costs, and postoperative quality of life. Patients over
the age of 80 tended not to recover most of the postoperative functional status, calling in to
question the cost-effectiveness of performing this procedure on the very elderly. Clinical factors
who proved themselves predictors of costs and outcomes included the patient’s operative status,
reoperations and postoperative complications (Anderson et al, 2002).

Physician Staffing
Concerns regarding patient safety have caused a re-examination of resident physician
work schedules. Dittus et al (1996) used computer simulation modeling to evaluate alternative
approaches to resident work schedules prior to implementation. They were able to predict the
effects on sleep and activity profiles as well as patient demand and job descriptions of the
housestaff (Dittus et al, 1996).
The authors used the internal medicine resident rotation at Wishard Memorial Hospital,
an urban public facility affiliated with the Indiana University School of Medicine. Their data set
is from 1989. The interns’ rotation average 97 hours per week at the hospital. Of this time,
approximately 68 hours was spent on inpatient care, four hours on outpatient clinic care, and four
hours on educational conference demands. The remaining 21 “idle” hours included 9 hours of
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sleep broken out over 2.3 days. Residents are classified based on their year in residency (interns
being first year students, followed by second year residents, third year residents, and senior
medical students). Residents and students are groups into “ward teams” which are collectively
known as “housestaff” (Dittus et al, 1996).
Model development was approached with the goal of identifying optimal team
composition (how many of what type of physician), on-call and vacation/day-off schedule
rotation, admitting and primary physician assignment and special considerations to deal with the
clinic schedule and providing backup. Important questions include: (1) how much do working
long hours and lack of sleep affect quality of care? (2) can learning be adequate without long
hours? (3) how important is continuity of care to the housestaff and the patients? (4) what are the
effects on nursing and ancillary staff? (Dittus et al, 1996).
The authors chose to use INSIGHT simulation language because it “provided structures
to model complex decisions by resources in determining which activities to pursue, the ability of
one activity to interrupt another, statistical integrity and an extensive collection of input process
distributions” (Dittus et al, 1996, p. 894).
A baseline model was created producing a series of outcome measures: (1) total and
maximum number of hours of sleep of housestaff while on call; (2) percentage of time spent at
various activities; (3) percentage of educational conferences housestaff was able to attend; (4)
percentage of days in which residents taught junior students; (5) total time housestaff spent at the
hospital; (6) the time of the patient’s request for care until the completion of that care; and (7)
measures of the patient’s continuity of care. The baseline model was then verified and validated,
allowing the researchers to begin altering inputs in order to generate modified models for
comparison purposes (Dittus et al, 1996).
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The authors note that one of the most important outcomes was the model’s ability to
predict the amount of sleep a resident would receive under various scheduling alternatives. This
could further be explored by examining the amount of uninterrupted hours of sleep, the
percentage of call nights the resident has no sleep and the percentage of tired housestaff the
following day. The model was able to provide certain measures related to the patient quality of
care in relation to resident fatigue. The model can also provide information on timeliness of care
by showing how various scheduling alternatives affect the time it takes for patients to receive
care from the physician, as well as the interruptions that the resident physician sees during the
workday. Continuity of care can be simulated, as well as the impact of alternative schedules on
educational components of the resident program (Dittus et al, 1996).
Examining physician staffing issues in the emergency department at the University of
Virginia Medical Center in Charlottsville, Virginia, Rosetti, Trzcinski and Synerud (1999) used
computer simulation modeling to test alternative emergency department attending physician
staffing schedules and to analyze the corresponding impact on patient throughput, resource
utilization and overall staffing expense. The management of the emergency department hoped to
be able to reduce staffing at slower times to reduce operating expenses and increase staff
resource utilization. Of course, reducing staff may result in increased medical errors — an
undesirable effect. The authors wished to develop an understanding of system performance
relative to various attending staffing schedules (Rosetti et al, 1999).
Using Arena 3.0 simulation logic software, the researchers modeled overall patient flow
through the emergency department and ED system processes for realistic operating conditions.
The authors chose Arena because it “allows the user to model real world and proposed systems
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using a set of templates of graphical modules, elements and support blocks for different
modeling constructs and capabilities” (Rosetti et al, 1999, p. 1535).
Because of the large amount of complex data elements in the patient flow process, the
data collection effort was separated into four different phases: patient visit time study, service
distribution time study, patient arrival processes, and transport and routing times. Based on this
data collection, four different scheduling approaches were examined. The first was to ask the
management of the Emergency Department for their strategies for staffing change. The second
approach used was to maintain an 8-hour double coverage shift of the current schedule but to
vary when that shift was scheduled. The third approach added a second double coverage shift to
the current schedule. The final alternative used patient arrival times to determine when the
maximum arrival rate was achieved and selected that time as the time period for double coverage
(Rosetti et al, 1999).
The authors used the Two-Stage Bonferroni Approach to conduct the comparative
analysis. The simulation showed how the best model decreased current total patient system time
in the emergency department by an average of 14.5 minutes per patient, or approximately 40
hours per day. It also showed that it decreased both utilization and percentage of long visits
(Rosetti et al, 1999).

Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
In an attempt to improve prehospital response and care, and thereby decrease patient
mortality and morbidity, Su and Shih (2003) used computer simulation modeling to evaluate an
existing Emergency Medical Services (EMS) system in Taipei, Taiwan and suggest
improvements. Their study focused on 23 networked EMS hospitals affiliated with 36
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emergency response units that perform two-tier rescues (advanced life support or ALS in
addition to basic life support, or BLS).
The researchers used the eM-Plant simulation program to build the model. Prehospital
rescue data from December 1-31, 2000, was collected, which included ALS and BLS
information. Data elements included the name of the response unit, time dispatch notified, time
unit notified, time unit responds, time of arrival at scene, time at which the unit left the scene,
time of arrival at the destination hospital, time at which the unit left the hospital and the time the
unit was back in service and available for the next call. Best-fit software was then used to
determine the best-fitting distribution of the times, at which point the distributions were fed into
the simulation. Additional distributions included type of rescue (BLS or ALS), utilization
distribution of the two rescue types and percentage of each assigned network hospital as a rescue
determination (Su & Shih, 2003).
After building the basic model, it was validated and verified by presenting it to experts in
the local EMS system familiar with prehospital rescue to ensure that it to the “correctness and
logic of the system flow” (2003, p. 61). Experts in computer simulation also verified the
simulation model, and output data was compared with empirical data in order to ensure
appropriate reflection of real-world activity (Su & Shih, 2003).
The authors analyzed potential alternatives to improve system performance by examining
performance variables. These variables included call waiting—when a call for ambulance
dispatch is awaiting execution, and includes waiting time as a result of no unit being available;
ALS and BLS event-site arrival time—the interval between the dispatching call and the arrival of
the ALS or BLS unit; hospital arrival time—the period between the dispatching of the call and
the patient’s arrival at the hospital, including on-site rescue time; ambulance utilization rate—
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the percentage of time the ambulance is being used as opposed to remaining idle; and turnaround time—the interval between the dispatch call and the unit’s return back to its subgroup
(Su & Shih, 2003).
Four alternatives where then compared. The first was to have one fixed network hospital
assigned to each emergency services subgroup to provide two-tier rescue. The second alternative
had the number of two-tier rescue units (rescuers and ambulances) assigned to each hospital
adjusted based on utilization rates and probability of patients have to wait for rescue (Su & Shih,
2003).
The third scenario altered the cooperative team mix between the emergency services
subgroup and the assigned network hospital, taking proximity into consideration. Each subgroup
could arrange dispatch sequences among hospitals in advance, establishing a rule set (when
subgroup sequence is not available, the second is selected and so on). Based on this rule set,
three dispatch models were simulated separately and compared (one fixed hospital, two hospitals
in prearranged sequence and three hospitals in prearranged sequence) (Su & Shih, 2003).
The fourth alternative varied dispatch rates. The three dispatch models from the third
alternative were used and the dispatch rate of the two-tier rescue was manipulated as 2, 10, and
20% respectively. The dispatch rate was defined as the “percentage of runs to which a given
ALS ambulance might be assigned” (2003, p. 63).
Using computer simulation, the authors were able to recommend that the second dispatch
model (two hospitals per subgroup) be established as the optimum model. It was shown to
decrease wait time probability as well as enhance proper prehospital treatment. It also
streamlined the dispatching process and decreased the random potential. Each EMS subgroup
was recommended to cooperate with two selected hospitals in a prearranged dispatch sequence,
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thereby simplifying the dispatcher’s decision procedure. The simulation was also able to identify
Hospital 22 as requiring unique attention, and its rescue teams should be increased to two instead
of one (Su & Shih, 2003).

Hospital Processes
Organizations are always under pressure to contain costs, improve efficiency, and remain
competitive, and health care organizations are no different. Computer simulation modeling has
proven itself a useful tool in this regard, with its process reengineering analysis tools being
applied to the health care setting.
Kumar and Shim (2005) note that hospitals “traditionally emphasize breakthroughs” in
procedures and technology in surgical care to stay competitive, yet patients may have trouble
discerning between all the available options in the health care marketplace. Hospitals therefore
seek to improve the surgical care process, since it “consumes significant resources, while it
generates significant revenues if managed properly [emphasis added].” They used computer
simulation to search for a more efficient surgical care process in hospitals which does not
compromise patient care. They used as their case study the National Hospital of Singapore
(Kumar & Shim, 2005).
As the demand for outpatient surgical operations increased over the years, coupled with
an acute shortage in health care manpower, hospital administrators turned to reengineering the
surgical care process to improve efficiency. Not surprisingly, managing surgical operations is
highly complex. There were a total of 21 operating theaters at the hospital, which in 2000
performed 59,377 surgical operations, 45 percent of which were outpatient surgeries. Out of the
21 theaters, 19 were allocated for outpatient surgeries. Many complexities arise in attempting to
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reengineer the surgical process. A large portion of the personnel working in the operating theater
are not under the direct control of the operating theater manager. Deviations from the daily
operating schedule are frequent and expected. The facility must account for emergency
operations, operations may be longer or shorter than anticipated, patients may be late or fail to
arrive or personnel can become sick or ill during the day (Kumar & Shim, 2005).
The model is constructed using entities, resources, and locations. Entities refer to “an
object or person that a simulated model processes.” The entities in this model represent patients
(classified by type and corresponding surgical discipline) and setup. Before a patient can be
routed to an operating theater, a set up is routed first, including the anesthetist. Locations
represent the fixed places in the system where entities are routed for processing or some other
activity or decision. These included the entrance, pre-op, the operating theater, recovery, and
exit. A resource is a “person, piece of equipment or some other device” used to treat or move
patients, assist in the performing of tasks for entities at locations or perform maintenance on
locations or other resources. There are three different resources (surgeon, anesthetist and gurney)
classified into 10 groups, of which 8 represent surgical disciplines and the last two represent the
anesthetist and gurney resources. The entities and resources follow the same path network—the
route taken by an entity or resource as it travels between locations (Kumar & Shim, 2005).
Historical data was used from January 2001 to September 2001. The authors had to make
several assumptions in order to create a more manageable simulation, including that patients
arrived following a Poisson distribution. Second, it had to assume that all patients stayed in preoperation for 30 minutes and recovery for 15 minutes. Third, it assumed no change in available
resources from January to September (Kumar & Shim, 2005).
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Working with the Department of Surgery, three alternative scenarios were constructed
and tested. The first extended operating hours of operating theaters without additional resources.
The second extended operating hours of operating theaters with additional resources. The third
declassified operating theaters across surgical disciplines—that is, each operating theater did not
have its own exclusive surgical discipline and could operate on a “first come, first serve” basis
(Kumar & Shim, 2005).
Each model was tested using the MedModel simulation program, which is “widely used
in evaluating, planning or re-designing hospitals, and operating other health care systems”
(Kumar & Shim, 2005). The original baseline simulation of the current process showed
bottlenecks occurring in patient wait times in theaters reserved for orthopedic surgery and in the
use of anesthetic resources. Scenarios one and two, which lengthened the operating time of the
theater while adjusting or not adjusting the available resources, did not significantly alleviate any
bottlenecks. Alternative three, which declassified operating theaters, significantly reduced the
bottle-neck in the pre-operation location, reduced patient arrival failures, and improved system
efficiency. Hospital administrators then modified scenario three and adopted it for use (Kumar &
Shim, 2005).

Health Care Organization Optimization
As mentioned in the above case study, computer simulation is often used by large
hospitals and other organizations to improve efficiency and remain competitive in the health care
marketplace. Alexopoulos et al (2001) note that “small healthcare facilities serving the poor are
equally in need” but often lack the finances and personnel required to develop and implement
simulation solutions (2001, p. 1386). They go on to explain that their project developed a “low27

cost, generic, discrete-event simulation model populated by a workflow Excel spreadsheet that
can be completed by clinic staff themselves, thus ‘customizing’ the simulation for their own
purposes” (2001, p. 1386). Their model focuses on childhood immunization services, but the tool
is intended to be flexible enough to serve other healthcare service delivery needs (Alexopolous et
al, 2001).
The authors used the Partnership of Immunization Providers (PIP), a collaborative
public/private effort created by the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine,
Division of Community Pediatrics, and an association of community clinics and small, private
provider practices. It was funded through the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention
(Alexopolous et al, 2001).
Health care facilities serving the poor often face unique challenges. Their facilities are
typically donated, clientele have financial and transportation issues, payment is minimal and the
clinics rely on grants and subsidies, and providers are motivated more by altruism. In spite of
these issues, they continue to face classic industrial engineering problems involving resource
management and efficiency (Alexopolous et al, 2001).
Using a workflow data acquisition tool which had already been created (the
Observational Checklist of Patient Encounters, or OCPE), the authors collected data and put it
into functional relationships in which to build the initial model of clinical operation. The initial
model is broken out into activities, including check-in, waiting room and pre-exam, exam,
checkout and charting and post-checkout. They then used the Arena computer software program
to generate a discrete-simulation. Finally, the OCPE was merged with the Arena model. While
they had to overcome certain technical issues in input analysis, process flow and output data
analysis, their research proved that a workable model was possible (Alexopolous et al, 2001).
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Ashton et al conducted a simulation based project in Great Britain to help the North
Mercy Community National Health Service Trust design and plan a NHS Walk-In Centre.
During the summer of 2001, the authors performed a study of the operation of a walk-in centre at
Old Swan in Liverpool, England. Their aim was to assist in a planned move and examine how
the different services could be operated to the best effect. They paid special attention to patient
flow, an assessment of how different levels of demand would affect wait time and the number of
patients in the waiting room (Ashton et al, 2005).
Using Micro Saint, a “visual interactive model system,” the authors developed a model
with three main parts: one for generating patient arrivals, one for clinics, and one for the walk-in
center (2005, p. 155). Data was gathered from a variety of sources, including NHS Clinical
Assessment System Reports, the baseline number of treatment rooms used on weekdays and
weekends, Monthly Service Reports of the Department of Health and clinical staff interviews.
The model was validated by comparing it to actual historical data for accuracy and reviewing it
with experts (Ashton et al, 2005).
While the model itself was very flexible, the main experiments were designed to test staff
suggestions and “best practices” obtained from other clinics. Several options were explored,
including examining the effect of using the current practice, reorganizing the reception area,
using different triage systems, and the timing and scheduling of the clinic and staff. The
researchers developed a number of alternatives to present to stakeholders and it remains a tool
for clinic staff to use to explore other reengineering issues (Ashton et al, 2005).
Masterson et al (2004) used a case study of the intensive care unit (ICU) at the US Air
Force’s Wilford Hall Medical Center to identify changes to improve the quality and delivery of
care within the Military Health System. The intensive care unit accounts for only 8 percent of
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inpatient admission, yet 30 percent of expenditures. The authors noted that the Military Health
System must “balance access to the intensive care environment with an opportunity for military
healthcare providers to maintain skills necessary to complete missions related to delivery of care
in wartime or other contingencies” (2004, p. 217). This study also serves to show that simulation
modeling can be applied to other health care environment outside the market world, much like
Alexopolous et al (clinics for the poor) and Ashton et al (a public walk-in clinic).
Wilford Hall Medical Center (WHMC) is a 275-bed trauma center in San Antonio,
Texas, which provides Level I trauma care for eligible military beneficiaries and all the citizens
of Southwest Texas. Because of limited resources, the ICU is sometimes closed to ambulance
traffic creating diversion to other facilities. WHMC required an accurate assessment of demand
for ICU services and capabilities, as well as analyzing different patient loads, ICU sizes and
operating policies (Masterson et al, 2004).
The authors employed the MedModel simulation program “to allow a more robust
simulation of multiple patient types, multiple bed types and alternative ICU operating policies”
(2004, p. 218). The model generates patients desiring ICU services and processes them according
to patient needs, number of available beds, and policies for bed utilization. Outputs are expressed
in terms of patients by type deferred, bed occupancy rates, percent of time the ICU is open to
trauma patients, costs and revenue streams and GME compliance (the extent to which the ICU
supports the graduate resident training requirements) (Masterson et al, 2004).
The first topic explored addressed ICU sizing, which attempted to ascertain the most
effective number and size of beds of each type over time. This included a series of options to
compare to the current configuration. Option 1 had fewer pediatric units in favor of more ICU
beds, while Option 2 had no pediatric beds altogether. Option 3 relocated the pediatric beds and
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Option 4 involved a reconstruction of the ICU floor. The model showed how, over time, Options
3 and 4 performed better in the long run (Masterson et al, 2004).
Next, the authors simulated the effect of the bed closure policy—the policy by which the
ICU is closed to certain patient types when the ICU reaches near capacity in order to ensure
availability of beds for emergencies. The first policy closes the ICU to medicine patients when
only one ICU bed remain unoccupied, while the other policy closes the ICU to trauma patients
when only one bed is unoccupied. Neither policy had much of an effect on the total number of
patients turned away or the bed occupancy (Masterson et al, 2004).
Partitioning policies were also examined. These policies limit certain patients to certain
bed types (medicine patients to medicine beds, surgical patients to surgical beds, etc.). Model
experiments that did impose partitioning improved the alignment of patients to bed types, but
had the negative effect of reducing overall access to the ICU (Masterson et al, 2004).
Finally, and not surprisingly for a military facility, the authors explored the effect of
military deployment of healthcare personnel. The authors were able to determine that closing the
ICU to certain patient types was able to mitigate some impacts, but overall a large detrimental
effect is still observed (Masterson et al, 2004).
Pasin, Jobin, and Cordeau (2002) used computer simulation to study the effect of
equipment pooling on a group of community service centers in Montreal, Canada. It attempted to
quantify the pooling process as well as allow stakeholders to reach agreement on polling
scenarios and to identify the conditions that would ensure equity. Local health service centers
were reluctant to participate because they feared losing control, a reduction in service level and
an unfair distribution of the costs of pooling resources (Pasin et al, 2002).
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The authors used AutoMod to develop the model. Complete pooling of resources, along
with other limited pooling models were tested. The limited pooling models were delineated by
rule sets, such as a local service center only having to make its excess inventory available if a
minimum amount of resources is maintained. They hoped to determine the total cost reduction to
all centers from pooling, to see whether certain centers would be worse off than others and to see
if the service centers had similar average unit costs (Pasin et al, 2002).
The simulation proved successful in quantifying the overall benefits of pooling as well as
showed that the significant losers were those centers with significant equipment overcapacity.
The simulation also showed that maintaining similar levels of overcapacity is preferable to
maintaining a minimum stock, maximum contribution or maximum debt rule in reducing overall
costs (Pasin et al, 2002).

Bioterrorism Preparedness
In the post-September 11th world, researchers are beginning to use computer simulation
modeling to examine various aspects of bioterrorism preparedness and response. Brookmeyer
and Blades (2003) published a study developing a statistical model to determine how many cases
of the disease may have been prevented by public health intervention. Kleinman et al (2005) use
simulation to test early warning systems of a biological attack based on health-care encounters.
Buckeridge et al (2006) also use simulation to determine the effectiveness of detecting an
inhalational anthrax outbreak (which this dissertation focuses on).
In developing their model, Brookmeyer and Blades (2003) distinguish between a common
source outbreak (one in which all cases were exposed to the same anthrax spores at the same
time and place) and a multicommon source outbreak (several distinct common source outbreaks
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that may be separated in both time and place). As an example, the 2001 anthrax outbreak in the
United States was a multicommon source outbreak. The key component of their model is known
as the iceberg effect. The cases initially observed in a common source outbreak are those with a
short incubation period, representing the “tip of the iceberg” of all potential cases. Those cases
with longer incubation periods in the lungs “might be prevented if they are receiving antibiotics
when anthrax spores in their lungs germinate” (2003, p. 782). It is therefore possible to estimate
the total number of potential cases (the iceberg), and therefore the number of cases that may have
been prevented from data on the observed cases and the incubation period (Brookmeyer &
Blades, 2003).
The authors estimate the number of potential cases and unknown dates of exposure using
information about the incubation period based on the 1979 Sverdlovsk outbreak in the former
Soviet Union, which occurred when spores were accidentally released through an open vent from
a facility doing bioweapons research. Related data is also taken from the HIV/AIDS epidemic
and the dual epidemics of bovine spongiform encephalophathy (mad cow disease) in animals and
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003).
The authors developed their simulation model based on variations in the size of the
outbreak (very small, small, and moderate) and the rate of detection (the difference in time from
the onset of the outbreak to the detection by public health officials of an anthrax case). Five
hundred simulations were performed on each of the nine combinations corresponding to the
sample sizes. Based on their study, they found that antibiotic use decreased the number of cases
of inhalational anthrax perhaps by half, although variations in sampling and uncertainty in the
incubation period distribution leave it an open question. Regardless, their analysis suggests that
there would not have been more than 50 cases of inhalational anthrax before antibiotic
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prophylaxis would be administered, and therefore an attack would not become very large before
a general response was provided. Therefore, swift public health reaction is critical to reduce
expected mortality and morbidity. A note of caution is given by the authors, since mass antibiotic
prophylaxis administration on thousands of people may result in individuals suffering from side
effects of the antibiotics, and therefore public health officials should be prepared to deal with
cases of people becoming ill from the antibiotics (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003).
Kleinman et al (2005) note that the first indication of a biological terrorist attack will
likely be people becoming ill. Syndrome surveillance systems have been developed in an attempt
to detect early this warning sign, not only of a biological attack but of other developing
pandemics (avian flu for example). The key to these systems is the techniques used to determine
when “too many” people are showing similar symptoms and have become ill. The authors
suggest that limited comparative work has been done on these syndrome detection systems. They
state that “theoretical comparisons are probably not possible in realistic settings and practical
experience is limited by small numbers of attack-like events” (2005, p. 101). Therefore, the use
of computer simulation modeling becomes an important evaluation tool (Kleinman et al, 2005).
Kleinman et al (2005) use the outpatient surveillance system to model, since it is the most
likely to be the type of system which detects an outbreak and it is simple and easy to replicate.
They relied on data collected as part of an outpatient surveillance system near Boston,
Massachusetts which classifies patient contacts by the common code, International
Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9). Each visit is classified into broad groups or
syndromes and then each encounter had patient census location ZIP code attached. A count for
each syndrome in each region was used for analysis (Kleinman et al, 2005).

34

Conceptually, the authors must include in their simulation a number of complex
elements. The simulation must determine who becomes ill, since exposure to anthrax does not
necessarily mean that a person becomes sick. The next step is that if the person is to become ill,
when does that occur? The time from infection to showing symptoms varies. The third step is to
determine among those persons eligible for surveillance the probability that he or she will seek
care at an outpatient clinic and if so, when that occurs. They assumed that the anthrax would be
introduced via crop dusting planes. They also assumed that this occurred only in the ZIP code of
residence and to all residents of each ZIP code (Kleinman et al, 2005).
Once these concepts were translated into the computer simulation model, two statistical
methods used in syndrome surveillance were compared: small area regression and testing
(SMART) and a SaTScan approach. “In the SMART score, generalized linear models are used to
establish the expected count per ZIP code per day, adjusting for seasonal, weekly, and temporal
trends, and holiday status” (2005, p. 105). A reoccurrence interval for each ZIP code is
developed for each day, based on the theoretical distribution of case counts and correcting for
multiple testing (Kleinman et al, 2005).
SaTScan identifies unusual clusters of ZIP codes each day. First, every possible
combination of ZIP code within a circular area around each ZIP code is considered and ranked
by likelihood to find the most unusual cluster. A Monte Carlo step determines whether that
cluster is actually unusual. The input to the SaTScan is adjusted by using the SMART scores to
account for the trends described above (Kleinman et al, 2005).
In their simulated scenario, a release took place in an urban area. The affected ZIP codes
showed little or no response on days one and two, but by days three and four a noticeable
difference was observed. The authors found that the two methods were “similar in their
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diagnostic value” but SaTScan appeared slightly superior. SaTScan identified 85 percent of
attacks within nine days, while SMART identified 83 percent. At four days, SaTScan identified
57 percent, but SMART only identified 50 percent. While both methods appear to operate
effectively, the authors were able to conclude that SaTScan was superior to SMART scores in
detection of an inhalation anthrax outbreak (Kleinman et al, 2005).
Buckeridge et al (2006) conducted a study comparing the use of syndrome surveillance
relative to clinical case finding for detection of an inhalational anthrax outbreak. Traditionally,
public health authorities have relied on clinical sentinel cases to identify and rapidly report any
outbreak, in spite of substantial investment in and availability of computer syndromic
surveillance systems, such as BioSense, developed by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). Rapid detection and reaction to any outbreak is believed to be key to reducing
mortality and morbidity. The authors aimed to develop a model for simulating the use of
healthcare services after a large-scale exposure to aerosol anthrax spores and then to use this
model to compare the benefit of syndromic surveillance to clinical case finding (Buckeridge et
al, 2006).
Their study design created a model simulating the dispersion of released anthrax spores,
the infection of exposed individuals, the progression of the disease in the exposed people and the
symptomatic person’s use of healthcare services. They generated outbreak signals and time until
the first clinical diagnoses for three amounts of spores released. This was superimposed onto
baseline administrative records of ambulatory healthcare visits in the Norfolk, Virginia area. The
usefulness of syndromic surveillance was assessed by modeling the healthcare system use that
would occur after an attack and compare this to actual administrative data over a one year period.
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The sensitivity and timeliness of syndromic surveillance and the detection benefit were
compared with clinical case finding for each simulated outbreak (Buckeridge et al, 2006).
There were four components to the simulation model: dispersion, infection, disease, and
healthcare system use. Three scenarios were defined by the amount of spores released (1 kg, 0.1
kg and 0.01 kg) and 1,000 simulations were performed on each scenario. Clinical case finding
was shown to detect outbreaks from an average of 3.7 to 4.1 days of release, depending on the
amount of spores released. Syndromic surveillance was shown to have a mean detection time of
3.1 to 3.6 days at a specificity level of 0.9 (resulting in 1 false positive every 10 days). When the
specificity level was increased to 0.975 (1 false positive every 40 days) the mean detection time
dropped to 4.3 to 5.1 days. Therefore, there is a trade-off in the benefit of syndromic surveillance
in specificity, but one which may be well worth it (Buckeridge et al, 2006).
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Statement of Theoretical Context
A theoretical framework is the lens through which we try and make sense of the world
around us. They are “abstract generalizations that present systematic explanations about the
relationships among phenomena; theories also knit together observations and facts into an
orderly system” (Wan, 2002). They “seek to explain or gain understanding and comprehension
of the environment, behaviors and events around us” (Beech, 2004). This understanding of
theories and theoretical frameworks is important. How we conceptualize the events, behavior or
general phenomena, which we observe, will greatly influence our understanding and response.
This dissertation will use complexity theory as its theoretical foundation from which to view
bioterrorism planning at a local hospital facility.
Complexity science does not fit neatly into a mainstream linear framework. When
component parts are examined individually, we may not see the interactions that produce
collective behaviors and characteristics (Beech, 2004). The world and human behavior is
“orderly, complex and disorderly” all at the same time, and these phenomena exist and interact
continuously (Cooper et al, 2004). Complexity science, therefore, is a holistic understanding. It
has become popular today because of the inability of traditional scientific methodology to
explain the world and human behavior. By viewing the world through the lens of complexity
theory, we can hopefully obtain better insight into complex patterns and behaviors, giving us
guidance in how we address important public policy issues.
As complexity theory migrated from the physical and natural sciences into the social
sciences, it has been adapted to a wide range of phenomena and behavior. Today, there probably
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exists no social science discipline that complexity science has not at least been attempted to
explain. Health care is no exception. Specific health care issues have been adapted and viewed
through complexity theory, such as health care systems and organizations (Begun et al, 2003;
Tan et al, 2005), management (Zimmerman, 1999), risk (Feinendegen & Neumann, 2006), public
health (Bar-Yam, 2006), nursing (Clancy & Delaney, 2005), health information outreach and
communication (Olney, 2005; Vogt, 2002), interprofessional education in health care (Cooper et
al, 2004), disease control (Rouse, 2000), hospital waiting lists (Smethurst & Williams, 2001) and
of course, bioterrorism preparedness (McDaniel, 2004). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has
also suggested that the best way to improve our health care system is to adapt complexity theory
to health care (Institute of Medicine, 2001).
Organizations and aggregates of organizations are generally thought of as “complex
adaptive systems,” or “CAS.” Complex adaptive systems are all around us, from the stock
market to human bodies to organizations. “Complex” implies diversity, “adaptive” implies
ability to change, and “system” is a set of interconnected or interdependent things. In CAS, the
“things” are the agents, whether people or institutions. Their actions are based on the information
they receive from the environment and conditions. A CAS is a densely connected web of
interacting agents, each operating from its own schema or knowledge (Begun et al, 2003).
Basic characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) include:
•

They exist in a dynamic state, with a large number of connections between agents and
environmental forces creating constant change

•

The relationships within CAS are complicated, entangled, and enmeshed. They can also
be nonlinear and discontinuous. A small change in one variable can create large changes
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down the road. Conversely, a large change in another variable can only have a small
impact. Feedback loops among agents generate either change or stability.
•

CASs exhibit emergent or self-organizing behavior. In other words, they adjust their
behavior based on the characteristics of other parties in the interaction.

•

CASs may be more sensitive to small changes in material conditions. An apparently
trivial difference in the beginning state of the system may result in an enormously
different outcome (unexpected too). This is known as the “butterfly effect.”

Complex Adaptive Systems are robust, and exhibit the ability to alter themselves
according to feedback. They possess a range of coupling patterns, ranging from tight to loose,
and these different patterns help organizations survive a variety of environmental conditions.
Loosely coupled structures cushion and moderate responses to strong shocks. More tightly
coupled structures tend to identify and implement quickly to a response. If one pattern of
interdependency is interrupted, other units can respond. CAS permits us to focus on nonlinear
relationships, looking at the system as a whole and not reduced to its component parts. Instead of
focusing on the margin (looking for variation as in modern scientific inquiry), CAS seeks the
critical mass threshold (Begun et al, 2003).
We can visualize Complex Adaptive Systems along a continuum as shown below in
Figure 3 (Tan et al, 2005).
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Figure 3: Perrow's Framework of Complexity

Health care is a “human-based system and preferences often change in human-oriented
systems.” The processes in health care are “invariably complex.” Consider that
There are more than 1,000 diseases, each of which in theory could have a different
pathway or guideline … ‘No carmaker produces 1,000 different models of cars or
provides for each model 2,500 different types of paint, 300 different arrangements of
wheels, or 1,100 different locations for each driver’s seat’ (Tan et al, 2005).

Other elements of health care systems reinforce the notion that it is indeed a Complex
Adaptive System. The underlying cause of complexity in health care is the improved access to
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information, which is being driven by advances in technology. As the growth in informational
requirements continues, the organization’s goals, division of labor and performance level are
affected. Local market pressures, regulatory pressures and a wide variety of other systemic issues
previously mentioned combine to further influence health care performance. Health care
organizations respond to these ever-changing needs through organizational change, moving away
from hierarchical structures to matrix-based systems and designs (Clancy & Delaney, 2005).
Another “telltale sign” of health care being a Complex Adaptive System is the “tendency
to exhibit unanticipated and often undesirable behavior” (Clancy & Delaney, 2005). Recent
health care policy changes have brought about examples of unintended consequences.
•

The introduction of low tar and nicotine cigarettes has actually increased the intake of
carcinogens as smokers compensate by smoking more cigarettes.

•

Recent reports highlighting patient safety issues in hospitals have placed significant
awareness on medication errors. In spite of increased reporting, the “unanticipated
distribution of harmful errors has increased (emphasis added) as reporting has improved.”

•

The use of “restricted formularies” by managed care organizations to lower utilization of
expensive medications has “actually increased health care system costs” in some cases.

•

The overuse of antibiotics is creating a growth in drug-resistant pathogens.

•

The growth in information technology has led to an increase in per capita paper
consumption within health care organizations (Clancy & Delaney, 2005).

These elements have significant impact on strategic management and change. Long-term
planning becomes very difficult. Formulating a long-term plan is a key strategic task within any
organization, yet in complex systems “small disturbances multiply over time because of
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nonlinear relationships and the dynamic, repetitive nature of chaotic systems.” As systems
evolve, they are subject to a “myriad of small random (or perhaps chaotic) influences that cannot
be incorporated” into a strategic plan (Levy, 1994).
Industries do not reach an equilibrium state, which is contrary to traditional economic
firm behavior. In fact, they can “never pass through the same exact state more than once.”
Changes in industry structure are “endogenous” and systems can “spontaneously self-organize
into more complex structures.” Dramatic change comes unexpectedly, often from the “dynamics
of the systems rather than from the influence of external shocks” (Levy, 1994).
While long-term planning is difficult at best, there is a surprising degree of order in
Complex Adaptive Systems. The improvement in computer simulation modeling capabilities can
yield accurate forecasts for at least several time periods. Outcomes are often “bounded” in
chaotic systems—that is, they fluctuate within certain bounds that are “determined by the
structure of the system and its parameters but not its initial condition.” In the same vein, while
we cannot know the precise state of a system in the long-term, we can trace repetitive patterns,
which provide useful information. In a way, this creates “deterministic chaos” which is
“characterized by self-sustained oscillations whose period and amplitude are nonrepetitive and
unpredictable, yet generated by a system devoid of randomness.” Levy uses the examples of
hurricanes and tornadoes. We cannot know exactly when they will strike, but we can know the
conditions that are likely to lead to their occurrence. The implication on organizations within
Complex Adaptive Systems is that guidelines are the most useful tool to cope with complexity.
“We need general guidelines because it is impossible to specify the optimal course of action for
every possible scenario” (Levy, 1994).
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This paper has briefly outlined the main features of complexity science, and shown how
they apply to health care systems and organizations. It now turns to a specific issue of national
importance: bioterrorism preparations at hospital facilities. How best can hospital administrators
and health care executives prepare for an eventuality which can be best described as a “low
probability, high casualty” event? Noted earlier was the recent GAO report showing that
hospitals were woefully inadequate in their preparations. In a recent study, only 21 percent of
physicians reported feeling “fully prepared” to treat victims of bioterrorism, but 80 percent felt
they were willing to do so should an event occur and they had not yet received adequate training
(Alexander & Wynia, 2003).
We tend to think of a bioterrorist attack as being a large event. Consider that bioterrorism
attacks are considered under the umbrella of “weapons of mass destruction,” conjuring up
images of mass-casualty events, where thousands or more are killed or injured. Yet any terrorist
organization, adversarial state or merely disturbed individual who wished to commit such an
atrocity would face significant hurdles in introducing a large-scale attack on the United States.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted this in a report to Congress (Congressional
Research Service, 2004). Rather it is a small-scale attack that should warrant real concern.
Indeed, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars on bioterrorism preparedness, many
would argue little progress has been made. “Vaccines and antidotes remain in short supply, local
officials have not developed plans to distribute medical supplies in a timely manner to citizens
and hospitals do not have the capacity to handle a sudden surge of patients” (Dando, 2005).
In fact, terrorists would not need to create mass casualties to create mass panic. A smallscale attack that only resulted in a few dozen injured and dead would almost certainly lead to
mass panic. Governments would respond by diverting even more resources toward homeland
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security and disaster preparations (Dando, 2005). Such a massive diversion of resources is bound
to have repercussions throughout society as money is channeled away from other programs and
into increased homeland security and disaster planning. This is a good example of a small
perturbation resulting in massive change, a component of modern complexity theory.
Evidence shows that larger, urban hospitals tend to be “better prepared” for a bioterrorist
attack as compared to more rural facilities (Scharoun, 2005). Indeed, larger communities seem to
have superior disaster medical response capabilities as compared to smaller ones (Harrison,
2005). Whether or not a plan is in place, there is usually a significant gap in the communication
of that plan to hospital staff, pointing to a “disconnect between planned policies and procedures,
and relay of such information to all hospital staff.” This would almost certainly lead to chaos in
the event an attack took place (Scharoun, 2005).
Today’s bioterrorism planning is constricted through its conception of the world as a
“Newtonian place,” leading to a conventional wisdom on how planning should be conducted and
developed (McDaniel, 2004). This conventional wisdom comes to resemble traditional costbenefit analysis. Alternative scenarios are put forward and then the probability of each scenario
is determined. Each scenario has its cost computed and the following equation is used:
Probability X Cost = Seriousness of Threat
Of course, since not all threats can be addressed, they must be prioritized. Once prioritized with
funding assigned, some sort of organizational structure is created to implement and execute a
plan. This is followed by an assessment of readiness, usually through training exercises and the
development of some sort of knowledge base for action. The end result is thought to be
“preparedness” (McDaniel, 2004).
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Complexity science teaches that the application of traditional reductionist, Newtonian
scientific methodology to policy making is probably not the best way to cope with a bioterrorism
environment. The characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems show this system of thought
inadequate, especially when considering health care systems (Bar-Yam, 2006; Clancy &
Delaney, 2005; Tan et al, 2005). Terrorism itself “displays the highest level of uncertainty in
terms of lack of information beforehand, and sometimes even afterward, on identifiable sources
of the event, the time and place of happening, and the impact” (Begun & Jiang, 2002).
Bioterrorism preparedness for hospital administrators begins first with acknowledging
that one is trying to prepare for the unpredictable. Some have suggested that executives adopt
“preemptive strategies” emphasizing traditional organizational techniques such as coordination
with stakeholder groups, an assessment of facility capabilities and source relationships, surge
capacity capability, security, internal staffing, equipment stockpiling, surveillance capabilities,
and readiness training (Zinkovich et al, 2005). Perry and Lindell (2006) analyze hospital
planning for weapons of mass destruction incidents and put forward six main elements that are
critical for hospital plans, including “incident command, hospital security, patient surge,
decontamination, mental health consequences and communication.” Many of these elements
exist with the line of thinking of complexity theory.
Begun and Jiang (2002) establish a series of guidelines for leaders in preparing health
care organizations for bioterrorism, shown below in Table 1. These guidelines have been
constructed within the theoretical framework of complexity science, and show how bioterrorism
planning is better suited within such a framework.

46

Table 1: Guidelines for Preparing Health Care Organizations for Bioterrorism
Guideline

Rationale

Develop leadership commitment to

Change doesn’t occur without top

organizational resilience and learning

commitment; change requires time and
resources

Support conditions for self-organization

Plans will be incomplete in meeting

--clear roles

bioterrorist events; anticipates complexity

--training

and unpredictability in responding to

--seek out ideas

bioterrorism; distributes accountability and

--timely feedback

responsibility for response

--connections
--communication
--identify expertise
Develop culture of resilience, learning, and

Links bioterrorism to larger category of

social responsibility

unpredictable events; avoids “flavor of the
month” change

Connect and collaborate with the

Competition is suspended in emergencies;

organizational field, including competitors

bioterrorism response is interorganizational

Prepare individual organizational members

Individuals need information and training;

and constituents for bioterrorism

constituents need reasonable (vs. ideal)
expectations

Contribute to and support governmental

Enrolls organization as a participant in the

and professional association plans for

prevention of bioterrorism; recognizes

preparedness

social responsibility and
interconnectedness
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Emphasized here is not that people should respond to “rules” but rather that they must be
prepared for “unpredictable, dynamic situations.” Complexity science can focus attention on
perspectives that might not be seen through traditional, reductionist thinking and planning. It
requires that attention be paid to “nonlinear interdependencies among organizational elements.”
It suggests that relationship ties, both in communication and reciprocity relationships enable
organizations to better function when the unexpected occurs. Complex Adaptive Systems “are
most effective when the members have attitudes that promote respectful interaction, mindfulness
and the development of collective a collective mind and when leadership is participative and
built on a bed of trust” (McDaniel, 2004). It generates the capacity for “sense making, learning
and improvisation,” preparing leaders and the organization to cope with events that cannot be
planned for in the traditional sense (McDaniel, 2004).
In fact, complexity theory teaches us that what traditional wisdom would suggest is a
threat is in fact an opportunity for change and transformation. By strengthening a health care
organization’s infrastructure to better deal with the unpredictable, it can better manage “surprises
of all types” (Begun & Jiang, 2002). Doing so will hopefully enable health care organizations to
better navigate the multiple issues affecting the entire system today, ensuring they not only
survive, but thrive in today’s complex world.

Research Design
As noted earlier, computer simulation modeling fits neatly within the theoretical
framework of complexity science. Modeling can serve as a useful decision-making tool, assisting
in resolving problems, or at the very least, informing the decision. There are five levels, noted by
Pritsker and O’Reilly (1999, pg. 1), at which simulation modeling can be employed:
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•

“As an explanatory device to define a system or problem;”

•

“As analysis vehicles to determine critical elements, components and issues;”

•

“As design assessors to synthesize and evaluate proposed solutions;”

•

“As predictors to forecast and aid in planning future developments;”

•

“As part of a system to provide on-line monitoring, status projections and decision
support.”

The use of computer simulation modeling as a tool has grown significantly as more
powerful information technology and computers have become much cheaper and more
widespread. Many industries are changing their design and evaluation process based on the use
of simulation, and health care is no exception. Computer simulation modeling remains, however,
a computerized mathematical tool, of which there are two basic types, according to Sinreich and
Marmor (2003):
1. Prescriptive models: “These models provide a prescription for how to set the decision
variables in order to achieve optimal performance of a predefined objective function.”
2. Descriptive models: “These models provide a detailed report on the system’s operational
behavior based on its description.”

Sinreich and Marmor, in their study of simulation technology being used to model
emergency department operations, note that simulation can assist hospital management in the
development and enhancement of their decision-making skills when evaluating different
operational alternatives.
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Regardless of the computer software program used, there is a general process by which
simulation modeling is conducted. Here, we will briefly outline the process as discussed in
Chapter 3 of Pritsker and O’Reilly (1999). The figure below helps us visualize this process.

Formulate Problem

Specify Model

Build Model
Develop
Model

Collect
Data

Define
Controls

Simulate Model
Run

Verify

Validate

Use Model

Support Decision Making

Figure 4: Modeling and Simulation Process, Adapted from Pritsker and O’Reilly (1999)
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Formulating the problem will require us to understand the problem context, “identify
project goals, specify system performance measures,” set specific modeling objectives and
define the system to be modeled. A series of questions are posed to help the researcher along in
this process. These include: “What operations and functions produce the systems output? What
procedural elements exist in the systems operation? What interactions occur between functional
units of the system? What information is available to characterize the operations, functions, and
procedures of the system?” (pg. 35). It is important to note that modeling objectives are
“statements of desired results in terms of performance measures.”
Specifying the model requires the researcher to use both art and science in
conceptualizing. One must “extract the essence of the system without including unnecessary
detail” (pg. 37). Good models have sufficient detail to be easily understood yet reflect in the
most realistic sense the reality of the environment or organization being modeled.
Building the model is a three-step process: develop the simulation model, collect the data,
and define the experimental controls. First, the model is developed with the structural and
procedural elements that represent the system. Data is collected to add this to the system. Finally,
experimental controls describe the procedures for performing a simulation and analysis of the
model. These establish the initial state of the network.
To simulate the model, the build model step must have been completed at least once. A
network simulation “advances time in accordance with the movement of entities through the
nodes and activities of the model” (pg. 46). Before the model can be used to support decisionmaking, it must be shown to run in accordance with its own specifications. In other words, we
attempt to ascertain whether the model is behaving as it is intended to. Finally, we seek
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validation that it is a reasonable representation of the system we are attempting to model. All of
these sub-steps may be performed concurrently.
Using the model requires the making of run simulations and the subsequent interpretation
and presentation of the output data. It may be used to draw inferences or test hypotheses, and
therefore statistical methodology should be employed here. It should be noted that a simulation
model “does not require a method for determining an optimal solution … [rather, it] specifies a
means to obtain experimental data from which alternatives can be selected” (pg. 49).
Finally, modeling and simulation is used to support the decision-making process. We
emphasize here that the model does not make the decision, but rather assists in informing the
decision. It is important to remember throughout the process that communication of the research
question and assumptions underlying the system and the model are clearly conveyed early on. A
model is only as good as the data used to create it.
The author has met with the CEO of the hospital facility, and has had two subsequent
meetings with the Emergency Department Medical Director and the Emergency Department
Nurse Manager. They have already provided data on the emergency department patient flow
process, daily patient flow data for the months of January 2006 and May 2006, staff schedules,
architectural drawings and the bioterrorism response plan. Two recent studies commissioned by
the facility will also provide useful data. The first was conducted a year ago for the purpose of
system improvement. It specifically analyzed the patient throughput process, timing each step
and made recommendations to the administration on how to reconfigure the patient flow process.
The second study is an after-action report of a recent disaster preparedness drill conducted in
February 2006. The author has been provided both of these studies.
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The author has also had the opportunity to spend time in the emergency department,
observing the normal activities. Based on these observations and on interviews with the
Emergency Department Medical Director and the Emergency Department Nurse Manager, we
can show the process by which patients enter the facility during an emergency. This flow chart
will be used to assist in the model development, and is shown as Figure 5.
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EMS

Walk-In

Triage

Lobby

ED Bed

Lean Track

Acute Care
See Doctor

Plan of Care
Lab/XRay/Med

Disposition

Observation

Admission

Bed

See Doctor

Discharge

Wait for Bed

Figure 5: Emergency Department Process
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Patients enter the emergency department one of two ways, either via ambulance or selftransport/walk-in. There is no helicopter facility. Once the patient enters the facility, he or she is
triaged and given the initial screening for an emergency medical condition. In the case of EMS
transport, this triage may already have occurred and the patient may be transported directly to a
bed in the emergency department or to the lobby. Otherwise, the patient, if a self-transport, waits
in the lobby for a bed. The patient is either assigned into the acute track or the lean track. The
acute track is reserved for cases that seem to be more severe, while the lean track is for patient’s
whose condition does not warrant immediate treatment, and instead he or she is seen in turn,
based on severity of the condition.
The emergency physician, who examines the patient and determines a plan of care, such
as ordering lab test, x-rays or prescriptions, automatically sees acute care patients. Lean track
patients may see either a physician or a physician-assistant (PA) to receive a plan of care. Lean
track patients are then placed in an observation lounge to await disposition, while acute care
patients have their disposition status determined immediately.
Disposition is either admission into the hospital or discharge. If the patient is admitted, he
or she is moved to a bed on the appropriate floor. If no space is available, then the patient waits
in a bed in the emergency department, a process called “boarding,” until a bed is made available.

Winter Park Memorial Hospital: Bioterrorism Response Plan and Mass Casualty/Disaster
Plan
In January 2002, the Florida Hospital system revised its Bioterrorism Response Plan
(hereafter referred to as “the Plan”), noting that the “potential for a terrorist action has increased
to the degree that calls for a comprehensive planning and preparation for all weapons of mass
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destruction (WMD) scenarios by healthcare facilities” (Hospital, 2002a). Later, its Mass
Casualty/Disaster Plan was also updated to reflect the changing environment subsequent to the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the follow-on anthrax attacks (Hospital, 2002b).
What follows is a brief overview of the current plan. Later, this plan will be evaluated using
computer simulation modeling of an inhalational anthrax release scenario.
The Plan notes that early identification of an outbreak of infection is critical to minimize
casualties and deaths. Common features of an outbreak are outlined, including a rapid increase in
the number of previously healthy patients with similar symptoms presenting to the Emergency
Department, a cluster of previously healthy persons from a common geographic area, unusual
clinical presentations, an increase in reports of dead animals and lower incidents of infection
among those persons who are protected or potentially isolated from exposure (i.e., confined to
home or no exposure to large crowds), an increase in the number of patients who expire within
72 hours and the presentation of patients who have recently traveled to foreign countries.
Practitioners are encouraged to report any unusual symptoms to the local county health
department or the Florida Department of Health (Hospital, 2002a).
The Plan briefly outlines the role of the various hospital departments (Security, Safety,
and Engineering). The Security Department will work with local law enforcement on traffic
control and perimeter security if necessary. It can even conscript staff from other hospital areas
(non-healthcare practitioners) to assist. The Safety Department is responsible for setting up the
decontamination site if needed and assure that enough supplies and personal protective
equipment is available. The Engineering Department will provide manpower to set up
decontamination equipment, ensure that necessary utility equipment is functioning and be
prepared to respond if any critical devices shut down. All three departments are to have
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preplanned for these events. Healthcare workers are expected to report to their predetermined
areas (personnel support, childcare, ancillary support to the Emergency Department) in the event
of an attack (Hospital, 2002a).
Since the Plan is designed to respond to a terrorist attack, it may be necessary for the
hospital to collect evidence for law enforcement to use in an investigation. The hospital must
also be prepared to manage the psychological aspects of the event, and provide counseling if
needed. It is important that information be conveyed in a clear, concise manner. The local or
state health department will assume control over communication with the media (Hospital,
2002a).
It is likely that the hospital will need laboratory support, since most facilities are not
equipped to identify bioterrorist pathogens. The laboratories will be responsible for collecting,
packaging and transporting specimens to county or state laboratories for identification. The
hospital pharmacy is expected to maintain a “reasonable, daily inventory” of common antibiotics
used to treat victims, and should be prepared to acquire more from federal and state established
pharmaceutical stockpiles. The hospital should also be prepared to stop the “non-essential use”
of prophylactic and therapeutic antibiotics until the additional stockpiles arrive (Hospital,
2002a).
Being a hospital, any event which occurs will not happen in a vacuum. Patients and
visitors will already be there receiving care. Those patients will have to be evaluated for quick
discharge. Acute patients may have to be transported to other facilities such as other hospitals or
skilled nursing facilities. Bioterrorism victims determined to be non-infectious can be sent home
with antibiotics and home care instructions if maximum bed capacity or staffing levels are
reached. The hospital should also realize that a large number of fatalities can occur, and in the
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event morgue capabilities are exceeded, short term arrangement of the use of refrigeration trucks
should be made in conjunction with state and local coroner authorities (Hospital, 2002a).
Any bioterrorist event will almost certainly result in the facility implementing its Mass
Casualty plan in conjunction with the Bioterrorism plan. The Mass Casualty plan is separate
since other events, such as multi-car or school bus accidents, explosions or accidental chemical
releases can occur which require the hospital to prepare for large numbers of victims. If
information is received prior to patients arriving, then the hospital should attempt to verify the
accuracy of the information. The Emergency Department Nurse Manager, Medical Director and
Administrator will attempt to ascertain how many additional staff is required and contact Florida
Emergency Physicians (FEP), the contract provider of emergency physicians and physician
assistants, as well as Emergency Department Nursing in order to call in additional medical and
nursing staff (Gabel & Sullivan, 2007; Hospital, 2002b).
Importantly, the hospital pharmacy is also contacted immediately and told to prepare for
the medication contingencies that a bioterrorism attack may bring. If there is information on the
nature of attack (whether it is anthrax, smallpox, etc.), then that information is provided so the
pharmacy can begin to procure additional pharmaceuticals.
At most, Winter Park Memorial Hospital can expect an additional two emergency
physicians and one additional physician’s assistant, ten additional nurses, three additional nurse
technicians and one additional Health Unit Coordinator on top of its normal staffing level (Gabel
& Sullivan, 2007).
The triage unit is moved outside of the emergency department to the front loading area.
Two to three registered nurses (RNs) and one nurse technician will be out front to assess patients
and code them as “Red,” “Yellow,” or “Green.” This code represents not only their acuity level,
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but also what area of the emergency department the patients will be sent to. In addition to the
nurses and nurse technicians, two to three “runners” will be placed outside to escort patients to
their various zones (Gabel & Sullivan, 2007).
The emergency department will be divided into zones that match the acuity level
descriptions of “Red,” “Yellow,” and “Green.” The Red Zone will be located in the acute care
area of the emergency department. It will have one dedicated emergency physician, up to two
nurses and one nurse technician to provide patient assessment and care plan determination.
Ideally, the nurse to patient ratio in the Red Zone is kept at three to one or four to one. The
Yellow Zone will be located at Track 1, and the Green Zone is held in the PC 1 and EXT 1 and 2
rooms. Remaining physicians, physician assistants, nurses and nurse technicians will be floating
between the Yellow and Green Zones providing assessments and care plan determination (Gabel
& Sullivan, 2007).
Non-acute patients can be held in the Observation Room, while acute patients are
admitted directly to the hospital. Theoretically, the hospital holds one hundred seventy-five beds
upstairs. The hospital would begin discharging all elective surgeries, discharges and other
patients able to be sent home to make additional room for acute patients moving from the
emergency department to the hospital. The current wait time for a patient to be admitted to the
hospital from the emergency department is ten and a half hours. We anticipate that would be
streamlined to a point (Gabel & Sullivan, 2007).
This process is important to understand because in the event of a bioterrorist attack, it
will be through the emergency department that the facility will be made aware that an event is in
progress. For the purpose of our study, we can envision two different scenarios: one in which an
attack occurs and patients begin presenting to the emergency department showing symptoms, but
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the facility does not have advance knowledge that the attack has occurred or that these patients
are victims of a bioterrorist attack. In this scenario, the facility will “discover” the attack and
implement its bioterrorist disaster response plan. The second scenario is that the facility is
contacted by the appropriate authorities and informed that an attack has occurred and to prepare
for incoming patients. This time, the facility is “warned” and can implement the plan prior to
patients arriving.
To assist in the use of the computer software and model development, the author obtained
agreement from Dr. Thomas Clarke, a senior scientist in mathematics at the University of Central
Florida’s Institute for Simulation and Training (IST) and from Carl M. Angelesea, MS CMSP C,
a doctoral student in simulation and modeling at UCF IST. Also providing consultation is Dr.
Duane Steward, a professor in the University of Central Florida’s doctoral program in Health and
Public Affairs, also an expert in computer simulation modeling and disaster planning.
This dissertation will use the ARENA computer simulation software program developed
by Rockwell International. The program is a Windows-compatible software program.

Building a Model of the Winter Park Memorial Hospital Emergency Department
As explained earlier, a computer simulation model is composed of three basic elements:
elements/units, resources, and processes. The first step in our model development was to
construct a computer simulation model of the Emergency Department at Winter Park Memorial
Hospital. The model would represent the Emergency Department in its “normal” state. To do
this, the hospital provided us with Emergency Department patient load data for the months of
January 2006 and May 2006, a process flow time study which had previously been conducted by
the Lean Project Team at Winter Park Memorial Hospital in July of 2005, and the staff coverage
60

schedule of emergency physicians, physicians’ assistants, nurses, nurse technicians and health
unit coordinators. Resources included available beds, stretchers, and chairs where patients could
be kept for treatment or observation. The process was shown previously in Figure 5, Emergency
Department Process.
A patient presents with symptoms. These were classified in the study by the Lean Project
Team as chest pain, abdominal pain, urgent care (UC) or “other.” After being triaged and seen by
a physician or physician’s assistant, the simulation models the patient’s disposition as either “in
patient” or “out patient.” The model also shows the patients who are currently in the process of
being seen or waiting to be seen.
We can show, step by step, how the model works.
The model logic sequence is as follows:

Figure 6: Model Logic
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The community creates patient arrivals using data given to us by the hospital. The data is
then used to generate patients using a Poisson probability distribution. This is the common,
preferred methodology of generating an arrival process in computer simulation modeling. This
methodology is useful for generating a number of arrivals when events occur over an interval of
time at a constant rate, when there are a number of items in a batch of random size or a number
of items required from an inventory (Law & Kelton, 2000).
Our model also accounts for resources utilized in the Emergency Department, including
how they are generated, allocated and used. Staffing availability is based on the actual data
provided by the facility, both in a typical day and during a bioterrorism attack. We have to
account for processing time of the staff unit. For example, if additional physicians and nurses are
called in during an emergency, it takes time for them to arrive. We can build in variables to
account for that time, including transportation issues. Ultimately, these resources are finite. The
facility cannot keep calling in additional staff. There may be none available as well as a
diminishing utility. Beds as well are finite, and become an important indicator of performance,
which we shall see later.
The Poisson probability distribution is used to create patients presenting with certain
symptoms identified by the hospital as most common. These symptoms are also the same ones
used in the July 2005 Lean Track Program Study. We chose to use these same symptoms for
purposes of continuity with the real world events the hospital faces. Below, we can show how the
Arena program simulates these patients using computer logic boxes.
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Figure 7: Patient Generation Process

63

The model shows “typical patients” arriving with basic problem recognitions of chest
pains, abdominal pains, requiring urgent care or “other” conditions. These conditions are then
distributed out to either ambulance mode of transport or walk-in/self-transport mode. The patient
is “placed” in a vehicle and then “taken” to the Emergency Department.
Patients enter the Emergency Department in one of two ways: via ambulance or selftransport/walk-in. Again, this arrival method uses the Poisson probability distribution. Arena
creates model logic boxes which show this process. The patient arrival process logic model is
shown next.

Figure 8: Patient Arrival Process

In the arrival logic, the patient arrives via a car or ambulance. The patient and vehicle
“split” with the patient entering the Emergency Department and being “time stamped” for the
simulation process. The vehicle is shown driving away, leaving the simulation system.
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Now that the patient is in the Emergency Department, it goes through the normal series of
events that a regular, real world patient would encounter. It is registered, triaged, examined, and
processed based on its condition. The model logic below explains how this was built into Arena.
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Figure 9: Patient Processing
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Ultimately, two things are shown happening to the patient: it either is admitted into the
hospital or it is discharged after receiving services. Arena is able to capture the time it takes for
each patient to move through the process once it arrives at the Emergency Department, so our
model will also show the amount of patients per hour per day Below, the model logic is given
for patient disposition.

Figure 10: Patient Disposition

The logic boxes described represent the “behind the scenes” or “under the hood”
calculations that the Arena software program is going through in order to simulate the processes
and events at Winter Park Memorial Hospital. We can now see an example of the model process
animation in the figure below.
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Figure 11: Emergency Department Animation

Validating the Model
Arena uses a Stochastic model of patient arrivals and processes once the patient is in the
Emergency Department. This means that each time the model is run, it produces different results.
It is validated by comparing the simulated results to the actual data provided by the hospital. In
order to produce enough simulation data, it was decided to simulate a thirty day run length thirty
times.
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Our model is compared to actual data from January 2006 and May 2006. The table below
looks at actual total volume data compared to the typical arrival data generated by our Arena
model.

Table 2: Actual vs. Model Data

January 2006
Typical January

Actual
Volume
3,627
3,517

May 2006
Typical May

3,310
3.202

Difference

Percent
Difference

110

3.03%

108

3.26%

Using the Emergency Department Summary Data for May and January 2006, we are also
able to show the variation in patient arrivals by hour as well as patient visits by the day of the
month for both months.
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Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month (January)
Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month
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Figure 12: Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month (January)
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Patient Visits/Hour (January 2006)

Mean Visits/Hour
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Figure 13: Patient Visits/Hour (January 2006)
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Table 3: Modeled Typical January Arrivals
T im e
0 0 :0
0 1 :0
0 2 :0
0 3 :0
0 4 :0
0 5 :0
0 6 :0
0 7 :0
0 8 :0
0 9 :0
1 0 :0
1 1 :0
1 2 :0
1 3 :0
1 4 :0
1 5 :0
1 6 :0
1 7 :0
1 8 :0
1 9 :0
2 0 :0
2 1 :0
2 2 :0
2 3 :0

In
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

te rv a l
- 0 1 :0
- 0 2 :0
- 0 3 :0
- 0 4 :0
- 0 5 :0
- 0 6 :0
- 0 7 :0
- 0 8 :0
- 0 9 :0
- 1 0 :0
- 1 1 :0
- 1 2 :0
- 1 3 :0
- 1 4 :0
- 1 5 :0
- 1 6 :0
- 1 7 :0
- 1 8 :0
- 1 9 :0
- 2 0 :0
- 2 1 :0
- 2 2 :0
- 2 3 :0
- 2 4 :0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

M e a n A r r iv a ls
T o ta l A r r iv a ls

D ay 01 D ay 02 D ay 03 D ay 04 D ay 05 D ay 06 D ay 07 D ay 08 D ay 09 Day
0
5
2
8
2
5
2
4
0
3
2
3
3
1
2
5
2
3
5
3
4
1
2
0
5
1
1
2
1
0
2
0
0
5
1
3
3
0
2
3
2
1
3
2
5
4
1
1
0
2
1
3
2
1
5
4
2
1
3
3
2
0
1
3
7
5
3
4
0
3
4
2
3
5
3
7
4
2
3
5
2
4
5
3
4
4
7
5
6
7
11
9
7
7
11
9
7
8
8
7
9
9
6
15
6
10
16
11
6
11
7
10
9
10
6
6
8
13
8
6
9
6
6
6
10
5
14
12
4
4
6
8
6
8
6
3
9
13
7
6
7
6
4
5
5
8
5
7
7
5
6
7
9
10
8
6
12
8
5
2
5
6
8
9
12
9
8
10
9
8
10
4
7
7
6
4
5
9
6
6
7
5
4
7
4
6
2
4
5
6
3
8
6
5
3
6
3
7
2
0
8
4
2
0
6
2
4
3
3
5
1
1
2
8
8
4
5 .7 0
1 3 1 .0 0

5 .6 1
1 3 4 .0 0

5 .3 9
1 2 6 .0 0

5 .1 7
1 2 7 .0 0

4 .9 6
1 1 6 .0 0

4 .2 6
1 0 3 .0 0

5 .3 5
1 2 5 .0 0

5 .1 3
1 2 2 .0 0

5 .1 7
1 1 9 .0 0

10 Day 11 Day
4
3
2
1
1
0
3
4
1
3
1
1
6
4
4
5
7
5
6
9
8
10
7
5
12
5
5
6
11
4
7
5
8
6
4
4
14
12
5
8
4
8
1
3
7
6
8
7

5 .7 4
1 3 6 .0 0
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5 .2 6
1 2 4 .0 0

12 Day 13 Day 14 Day
2
2
4
1
4
1
0
4
4
1
1
1
2
0
1
2
0
1
4
0
2
4
2
8
3
5
3
7
3
5
10
7
5
11
5
9
6
12
4
5
6
9
9
7
6
7
5
6
8
10
9
4
5
9
6
9
3
8
3
7
10
9
8
3
4
4
4
3
3
5
5
3

5 .2 2
1 2 2 .0 0

4 .7 4
1 1 1 .0 0

4 .8 3
1 1 5 .0 0

15 Day 16 D ay
2
2
4
1
2
5
4
1
1
0
2
2
2
2
1
6
3
3
5
8
4
7
7
4
6
7
5
16
6
7
6
6
10
0
11
6
8
8
10
7
7
6
6
4
6
7
0
2

5 .0 4
1 1 8 .0 0

5 .0 0
1 1 7 .0 0

17 D ay 18 D ay 19 D ay 20 D ay 21
2
3
3
1
1
5
2
0
3
5
1
1
1
1
2
0
2
6
0
0
1
0
2
1
2
0
5
1
1
3
1
1
0
3
0
3
0
1
1
4
3
6
6
4
7
5
6
8
10
3
6
8
7
7
3
15
4
9
6
5
9
3
8
9
10
3
5
4
11
6
6
7
4
6
8
7
8
7
5
4
6
5
9
2
2
4
3
6
5
7
4
5
3
5
4
11
4
8
5
5
11
5
8
8
4
12
2
9
5
7
8
7
6
4
5
3
3
3
3
1

5 .3 9
1 2 6 .0 0

4 .0 0
9 5 .0 0

5 .0 4
1 1 9 .0 0

4 .5 7
1 0 6 .0 0

4 .2 2
9 8 .0 0

Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month (May)
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Figure 14: Mean Hourly Arrivals by Day of Month (May)
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Patient Visits/Hour (May 2006)

Mean Visits/Hour

1
24
23

9

2
3

8
7

22

4
6
5

21

5

4
3
20

6
2
1

19

0

7

18

8

17

9

16

10
15

11
14

12
13

Figure 15: Patient Visits/Hour (May 2006)
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Table 4: Modeled Typical May Arrivals
T im e
0 0 :0
0 1 :0
0 2 :0
0 3 :0
0 4 :0
0 5 :0
0 6 :0
0 7 :0
0 8 :0
0 9 :0
1 0 :0
1 1 :0
1 2 :0
1 3 :0
1 4 :0
1 5 :0
1 6 :0
1 7 :0
1 8 :0
1 9 :0
2 0 :0
2 1 :0
2 2 :0
2 3 :0

In te r v a l
0 - 0 1 :0
0 - 0 2 :0
0 - 0 3 :0
0 - 0 4 :0
0 - 0 5 :0
0 - 0 6 :0
0 - 0 7 :0
0 - 0 8 :0
0 - 0 9 :0
0 - 1 0 :0
0 - 1 1 :0
0 - 1 2 :0
0 - 1 3 :0
0 - 1 4 :0
0 - 1 5 :0
0 - 1 6 :0
0 - 1 7 :0
0 - 1 8 :0
0 - 1 9 :0
0 - 2 0 :0
0 - 2 1 :0
0 - 2 2 :0
0 - 2 3 :0
0 - 2 4 :0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

M e a n A r r iv a ls
T o ta l A r r iv a ls

D ay 01 D ay 02 D ay 03 D ay 04 D ay 05 D ay 06 D ay 07 D ay 08 D ay 09 D ay 10 D ay 11 D ay 12 D ay 13 D ay 14 D ay 15 D ay 16 D ay 17 D ay 18 D ay 19 D ay 20 D ay
6
2
3
3
2
6
3
4
6
4
1
2
4
4
5
3
0
3
6
2
2
1
3
4
2
2
1
2
3
2
4
3
2
2
0
1
1
2
4
3
1
0
1
2
3
1
2
3
0
0
2
0
4
4
1
1
2
0
1
3
0
1
2
1
0
0
0
1
2
2
0
2
6
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
1
1
1
2
4
3
0
0
3
0
2
4
3
0
0
1
1
0
1
3
1
1
1
0
1
2
2
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
2
0
4
2
4
6
0
1
2
2
2
0
2
2
6
3
1
2
1
0
1
0
3
3
4
3
0
1
4
4
1
2
1
3
1
6
1
1
2
1
2
3
1
4
3
5
4
2
5
6
4
9
3
4
4
4
7
3
8
5
3
2
5
3
3
4
6
4
4
6
4
12
9
4
7
4
5
5
4
1
3
9
4
4
12
11
7
6
7
7
11
7
12
8
5
4
7
5
8
8
4
8
7
4
5
8
4
2
9
7
6
8
8
6
9
5
6
2
13
5
7
4
11
8
8
6
10
6
5
9
4
7
6
5
11
7
8
8
6
4
6
9
5
7
7
5
7
8
2
9
3
6
2
8
6
7
3
4
6
4
6
8
9
4
7
6
9
3
6
9
7
8
6
4
7
4
7
13
7
9
7
5
7
6
6
1
6
6
4
2
1
10
4
9
3
7
7
6
4
5
7
5
7
5
7
4
8
2
5
5
9
8
4
10
7
9
9
2
8
3
10
10
7
7
9
4
7
5
8
4
4
9
5
6
4
8
5
6
5
7
5
4
9
3
6
10
6
3
4
4
3
7
4
11
9
3
7
3
5
13
6
6
6
1
5
6
4
8
10
5
7
5
8
6
5
3
3
4
5
8
6
7
9
6
6
7
6
3
6
6
3
8
7
7
5
3
5
1
7
1
8
9
8
7
9
5
6
7
5
5
7
6
6
3
9
3
6
3
4
6
4
8
2
4
5
5
5
6
8
5
7
6
5
2
2
1
0
10
6
4
4
5
3
7
5
3
1
3
4
3
3
4
2
5
6
8
1
8
2
2
8
3
1
7
5 .1 7
1 2 5 .0 0

4 .4 8
1 0 5 .0 0

4 .5 2
1 0 7 .0 0

3 .7 0
8 8 .0 0

4 .5 7
1 0 7 .0 0

4 .6 1
1 1 2 .0 0

4 .0 9
9 7 .0 0

5 .6 5
1 3 4 .0 0

4 .3 0
1 0 5 .0 0

4 .8 3
1 1 5 .0 0

75

4 .8 7
1 1 3 .0 0

4 .2 2
9 9 .0 0

4 .5 7
1 0 9 .0 0

4 .2 2
1 0 1 .0 0

4 .5 7
1 1 0 .0 0

3 .8 7
9 2 .0 0

4 .5 7
1 0 5 .0 0

4 .7 8
1 1 3 .0 0

4 .9 6
1 2 0 .0 0

4 .4 3
1 0 4 .0 0

21
1
3
4
3
1
0
2
5
5
1
9
11
11
7
4
7
8
6
5
7
10
3
4
3

5 .1 7
1 2 0 .0 0

Through this comparison, we can see that patient volume, patient arrival times by day and
patient visits by hour resemble both May 2006 and June 2006 data.
We also validate our model by comparing the arrival mode (ambulance versus walk-in)
and the complaint (chest pain, abdominal pain, urgent care, and other) in our model with the
actual data. In the logic display below, the problem recognition block (the diamond) sends 12
percent of patients down the chest pain path, 33 percent of patients down the abdominal pain
path, 30 percent of patients down the urgent care path, and the remaining 25 percent down the
“other” path. These percentages are determined by the real world hospital data provided by the
hospital.
Patient arrival mode percentage is also broken down using real world data. We are given
that 66 percent of chest pain patients arrive via ambulance, while 33 percent arrive via walkin/self-transport. Similarly, 18.8 percent of abdominal pain patients call for EMS transport, while
81.82 percent come on their own.
Patient admission ratios are also determined in a similar way. Probability distributions are
entered into the model based on real-world data provided by the hospital. Over a period of 30
runs of 30 days, we find the same percentages of patients are admitted and discharged in our
model as reflected in the actual hospital data. These examples are shown below.
We can show how these percentages reflect the model process in the following two
charts. Each one represents an actual run of the model. When converged over thirty runs, the
model produces the same percentages as the actual hospital data.
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Figure 16: Model Patient Arrival Condition Example 1
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Figure 17: Model Patient Arrival Condition Example 2
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Figure 18: Patient Admission Example 1
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Figure 19: Patient Admission Example 1a (Magnified)
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On May 22, 2007, we presented our model and tentative results to the staff members of
the Emergency Department at Winter Park Memorial Hospital. Included in the staff present were
Randal Poole, MD, and emergency physician and the Emergency Department Medical Director,
Barbara Gabel, MA BSN CEN, Director of Emergency Services and Diane Sullivan, ANM BSN
and the Disaster Response Coordinator for the Emergency Department. Based on their
examination, our model was found to be representative of the Emergency Department.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

Inhalational Anthrax Attack
Our results model what happens in the event of a biological attack using inhalational
anthrax. We can assume that the attack was carried out using a crop dusting plane dispersing
aerosolized anthrax spores over a population. We can envision two scenarios:
1. The attack is discovered immediately. The local county health department alerts Winter
Park Memorial Hospital that patients will soon be arriving who are victims of a biological
attack using inhalational anthrax. The Emergency Department has advanced warning to
begin implementing its Biological Terrorism Response Plan.
2. The attack is not discovered. Patients begin arriving at the Winter Park Memorial
Hospital Emergency Department with inhalational anthrax, but are not aware that they
are victims. They present in various stages of the infection. It is not until patients begin
entering into respiratory distress that facility staff suspects that inhalational anthrax may
be the culprit. The local county health department is notified, and the facility transitions
into their Response Plan mode.

In both cases, one of the critical problems faced by the facility will be the arrival of the
so-called “worried well.” We assume that once information is made public that an attack has
occurred, people who might otherwise be healthy or merely have flu-like symptoms unrelated to
inhalational anthrax will begin to come to the hospital Emergency Department seeking treatment.
This additional influx of patients, on top of actual anthrax victims as well as those patients who
require emergency services and care unrelated to the biological terror attack will almost certainly
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place a great strain on the Emergency Department’s capacity. An important part of simulation
modeling is analyzing how the Emergency Department, once it has initiated its Biological
Terrorism Response Plan, performs in the face of this new challenge.
The problems to be faced by the Emergency Department certainly are not limited to the
influx of the “worried well” and the ability of the Emergency Department to handle the
additional capacity. The facility must begin an expedited admissions and discharge process of
patients in the Emergency Department who are not anthrax attack victims. Currently, the
Emergency Department is showing an admissions time of a little over ten hours, from the time
the physician orders the patient to be admitted to the facility to the time the patient is actually
transported to a bed in the hospital. Discharge times can also be large. A backlog of patients will
create a serious problem for the facility to be able to treat terror attack victims (Gabel &
Sullivan, 2007).
Another issue will be the impact on patient length of stay (LOS) as “normal” patients
seeking emergency services and care are joined by anthrax attack victims and the “worried well.”
There are many factors affecting length of stay, ranging from the ability of patients to be
examined and seen by available staff, the time it takes for laboratory results to be ordered,
completed, returned and reviewed by the clinician and admissions and discharge process time
(Gabel & Sullivan, 2007).
Currently, the Emergency Department has to rely on clinical case findings in order to
detect any sort of biological attack. We know from the literature that an outbreak of inhalational
anthrax will not be discovered for approximately four days (Buckeridge et al, 2006). This means
that the Emergency Department will be operating for several days in the midst of an attack
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without having implemented its Biological Terrorism Response Plan. We can anticipate that
patient mortality will certainly be affected.
Once the plan is initiated, one of the first items to be addressed is staffing. The
Emergency Department Charge Nurse, Emergency Department Medical Director and the
hospital administrator on call will have to make an immediate determination of staffing needs.
Additional emergency physicians, nurses, nurse technicians, and health unit coordinators can be
called in. However, the staffing decision will be determined in a “fog of war” in an emergent
discovery scenario. The number of potential victims would be unknown at that point, so
additional staffing may not even be called in if the number of anthrax victims is only one or two
at the time the decision is made. As additional staffing comes aboard, along with additional
victims and potentially the “worried well,” another unknown is how the impact of additional
staff will affect patient flow, length of stay, mortality and the discharge/admissions process. It is
conceivable that too many people can clog up the working of the Emergency Department, even
in a disaster scenario, as well as too few.

Emergency Department Bed Capacity
A key indicator of the performance of the Biological Terrorism Response Plan will be
how Emergency Department bed capacity is affected by the attack. Whether the scenario
envisioned is an Advance Warning or an Emergent Discovery at the Emergency Department, we
can anticipate that beds will begin filling up. The Response Plan calls for the Emergency
Department to be divided into zones Red, Yellow, and Green, and patients are triaged to those
zones based on their acuteness. This change in process flow should theoretically permit more
patients to be seen by clinicians and for more patients to move through the Emergency
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Department to either be discharged or admitted in a quicker fashion. Our model tested this by
analyzing how bed usage was affected by the increase in patients, and most specifically, the
influx of the “worried well.”
Our findings are able to be presented on the following charts.

Advance Warning Scenario (May Patient Load)
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Figure 20: Advance Warning Scenario—May Patient Load
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Advance Warning Scenario (January Patient Load)
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Figure 21: Advance Warning Scenario—January Patient Load

The data indicates that under the Advanced Warning scenario, Emergency Department
bed capacity declines as expected, however beds continue to remain available at the mean and
upper limits of patient volume. One point of caution should be made at this point. This data is not
predictive in nature, it is descriptive. In other words, the model has generated results based on
certain assumptions. This should not be taken to mean that with a twenty percent increase in
patient load due to an influx of the “worried well” in a “January type” month (i.e., high patient
volume), there will be two to three Emergency Department beds of capacity available on
average.
The “upper limit” in both the typical May and January type months represents lighter
patient volume days which tend to occur in those months. The “lower limit” obviously shows the
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impact on the Emergency Department when it is full or above-full capacity. (It is not uncommon
for the Emergency Department to over 100 percent capacity.) As can be expected, when the
Emergency Department is at or above capacity, no additional bed space is shown as being
available under any scenario.
In our simulations of months with “May-like” patient loads, mean bed capacity does not
become an issue until the patient load increase increases from twenty percent to thirty percent. At
that point, we notice a precipitous drop in available Emergency Department beds, from just
under six to barely over two. Up to that point, a twenty percent increase in patient load due to
“worried well” only resulted in a loss of capacity from just over six beds to above five beds – an
estimated one bed. Interestingly, at the upper limit level, bed capacity does not appear to drop off
significantly until the patient load increases from forty percent to fifty percent.
A “January-like” month shows a steeper decline in mean available bed capacity as patient
loads increase up to forty percent. At that point, the mean bed capacity actually levels off when
the patient load rises from forty to fifty percent. At the upper limit of patient load increases, the
bed capacity seems to step down dramatically as patient load increases from ten percent to thirty
percent, levels off, and then steps down again.
When we look at the Emergent Discovery scenario—the one in which patients present to
the Emergency Department not realizing they are victims of anthrax attack and the facility is
unaware an attack occurred, we actually find that bed capacity remains the same in both
“January-like” and “May-like” months.
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Emergent Discovery Scenario (May Patient Load)
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Figure 22: Emergent Discovery Scenario—May Patient Load
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Emergent Discovery Scenario (January Patient Load)
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Figure 23: Emergent Discovery Scenario—January Patient Load

What sort of inferences can be drawn from the data? First, we see that regardless of the
scenario, Emergency Department bed capacity remains available. It is important to remember
that the actual capacity available shown is not predictive but descriptive based on the
assumptions we used in developing the model, the Bioterrorism Response Plan, and the
scenarios.
In general, the flexibility of the response plan to contingencies is what probably leads to
additional capacity being available under the given scenario. Response plan flexibility is a key
recommendation in bioterrorism planning literature (see McDaniel, 2004). It is also a good
example of how Complexity Theory is the proper theoretical lens with which to view
bioterrorism response. This ability to adapt and show flexibility may also be indicative of the
organizational processes and staff mindset in the Emergency Department setting. Emergency
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care providers are used to dealing with providing care in an environment where information is
limited or unknown, often having to make fast decisions and change processes and care based on
the situation at hand.
As is often the case in computer simulation modeling, the results tend to beg more
questions. For example, why does bad capacity drop precipitously between a 10 percent increase
and 30 percent increase in patient load at the “upper limit” during a “January-type” high-volume
month? We know that the upper limit of bed capacity represents the rosiest of days in a typical
Emergency Department—i.e., a low patient volume. There is also a noticeable drop in mean bed
capacity during “May-like,” low volume months as the mean patient load increases from 20
percent to 30 percent. Is this reflective of the effect of the marginal utility of additional staff, or
the process of the Bioterrorism Response Plan beginning to wane in effectiveness? Perhaps it
shows that the admissions process into the hospital or discharge process out shows dramatically,
thereby leading to longer patient stays and subsequently, less bed capacity? Further analysis and
data will be necessary to address these and other questions adequately.
Of course, the effectiveness of the Bioterrorism Response Plan cannot be measured by
one indicator alone (Emergency Department bed capacity), albeit an important indicator we
believe. System performance during a biological attack will be a function of multiple, interacting
variables. Computer simulation modeling is a valuable tool in that these additional variables and
scenarios can be added on to an existing model. Model results can then be used to evaluate how
these input changes have affected our output in the safe, benign world of computer simulation
rather than the time-consuming and less comprehensive process of running an actual disaster
drill. Worse yet would be the onset of an actual attack and finding out the answer to questions
both known and unknown “the hard way.”
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary
Using complexity theory as our structural framework, this dissertation used computer
simulation modeling to attempt to test the effectiveness of the biological response plan at a local
hospital facility. We chose Winter Park Memorial Hospital because its size and variation in
patient volume is fairly representative of a typical hospital in America, and because it is located
in an area of the United States that is considered a prime target for terrorist attack due to its
popularity world wide.
We were provided data from the hospital on patient volume, length of stay, staffing,
clinical care processes, changes in the process in the event of a known biological attack and other
data to create a model. This model was validated by comparing results with the real world data
and presenting it to the hospital staff, experts in how their system works. Once it was validated,
we were able to proceed with introducing the various scenarios of an attack.
Two types of attack scenarios were imagined. In both cases, we assumed that the
biological weapon of choice was inhalational anthrax dispersed in an aerosolized form. The
Advance Warning scenario was based on the assumption that the local county health department
notifies the hospital that an attack has occurred and to be prepared to receive patients infected
with inhalational anthrax. The Emergent Discovery scenario assumes that neither the patients,
facility, nor authorities know that an attack has occurred. Patients begin presenting to the
Emergency Department showing flu-like symptoms. Patients then deteriorate into severe
respiratory distress. Through clinical case findings the facility “discovers” that it has victims of
inhalational anthrax, notifies local authorities, and initiates the response plan.
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The effectiveness of the plan was evaluated based on its impact on Emergency
Department bed capacity. In both scenarios, we anticipate that patient volume will begin to
increase as both anthrax victims and the “worried well” come to the Emergency Department
seeking treatment. Emergency Department bed capacity will give us some clue into how
effective the plan is in managing this influx of victims and “worried well” while still having to
deal with regular patients seeking emergency services and care.
Under both scenarios and in simulated high volume and low volume months, the
Emergency Department showed resiliency in maintaining some bed capacity even when patient
load increased by 50 percent. This suggests that the plan’s flexibility, and the ability of the
Emergency Department to operate in a highly complex environment, is conducive to being
prepared for a scenario involving a biological attack.

Limitations
We acknowledge that this study is limited in a number of respects. First, it is an attempt
to utilize computer simulation modeling to evaluate a hospital facility’s bioterrorism response
plan, which it appears to have never been done. Modeling is still not widely used in analysis of
health care issues, certainly not to the extent that it has been used in other fields. Therefore, this
research may be difficult to compare to previous efforts. No doubt future work will further
improve and refine the techniques of applying modeling to bioterrorism preparedness by
hospitals.
In choosing Winter Park Memorial Hospital as our unit of analysis, this work becomes a
case study. Therefore, generalizing this work to other facilities is problematic at best. Winter
Park Hospital is best described as a community hospital. What is necessary is to expand on this
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study, perhaps locally. We could analyze the response plans of the other campuses in the Florida
Hospital system using this methodology. There is another hospital system in the Central Florida
area which can also serve as a basis of comparison. From these additional units of analysis, we
can perhaps begin to formulate a matrix of common indicators of preparedness. In any case, as a
case study, we cannot expand upon these findings to other facilities, which limits this research’s
usefulness to a more qualitative nature.

Future Work
How can the effectiveness of a specific biological response plan be evaluated and what
indicators should be used to measure that effectiveness? Computer simulation modeling in this
dissertation has proven itself reliable and valid in creating a “working” Emergency Department
based on the data from Winter Park Memorial Hospital. This model can then be subjected to any
number of tests and scenarios, even those not necessarily related to biological terrorism response.
Time constraints in producing this dissertation prevented further, in-depth analysis. However,
future research is planned using the volumes of data already generated to explore the question of
how effective the biological response plan is. Agreements have already been secured with Dr.
Aaron Liberman and Carl Anglesea to write future articles to address several more points.
Future work can address several issues. We can briefly outline possible avenues of
research. These can include:
•

How does the implementation of the Biological Response Plan impact patient length-ofstay for both anthrax victims and regular emergency services patients? Length of stay
remains an important indicator of Emergency Department performance.
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•

What is the optimal rate of staffing for the Emergency Department in the event of a
biological attack? Staffing is built into the model by having a finite number of resource
units available in the simulation program based on information provided by the facility.
These units take time to arrive, provide care and cannot exist in the model indefinitely.
Since they represent human beings, we have to account for humans needing rest for
example, even in an emergency. These staff care “called in” in the case of an emergency,
so that takes time. We wonder whether there is a diminishing marginal utility in the
addition of staff. This can also be explored in the type of staff. Does the addition of one
emergency physician improve clinical care timeliness? Would it be more advantageous to
add more nurses or support personnel as opposed to physicians? What is the optimal staff
mixture to patient?

•

The Emergency Department currently relies on clinical case findings in order to
“discover” an untoward event and lacks a standard syndrome surveillance program. In the
event of an anthrax attack where the attack is unknown, what might the impact be on
patient mortality and morbidity since the literature shows that the attack would likely
remain undiscovered for three to four days? Would syndrome surveillance improve
overall system performance in the event of an attack?

•

The bed capacity in the Emergency Department shows varying rates of decline based on
the increase in patient load. What factors influence the varying rate of that decline?

•

How does the Emergency Department response plan fit within the entire hospital
facility’s plan? For example, other departments are “expected” to have developed their
own plans in the event of a biological attack, including Hospital Security, Safety,
Engineering, Housekeeping, Laboratory Services, and Pharmacy Services. This
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dissertation separated the Emergency Department from the hospital and evaluated its plan
only. How might the plan of the Safety Department impact the Emergency Department
for example, as well as the overall ability of the hospital to respond to an event?
•

The admissions process and the patient discharge process are a critical factor in patient
length of stay and in bed capacity, both during typical days and during a response to a
disaster. What factors drive the time it takes for a patient to be admitted or discharged?
Can various processes be altered to expedite that process, or do common assumptions not
stand the test of research?

•

An attack using anthrax is just one of many types of potential attacks. As noted,
inhalational anthrax is non-contagious and patients present with common flu-like
symptoms. However, how does the Biological Response Plan perform in the case of a
smallpox release, botulism, plague, tularemia, or viral hemorrhagic fever? Any number of
biological agents will require radically different procedures, including contact
precautions, isolation, and decontamination of patients. And what if the attack includes
multiple releases of multiple types of agents, requiring the facility to adapt to different
scenarios at the same time? This additional strain on resources may show the need for
different response plans based on the nature of the attack.

•

A number of community factors may play into a facility’s ability to respond to an attack,
many of which are outside of its control. One example might be the availability of public
transportation. A large number of individuals may try to reach the hospital but do so
through the local bus system, which is the only public transportation system available.
How would interruptions on public transportation service affect patient arrivals, which in
turn affects the facility’s overall response effort?
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•

What indicators lend themselves to being useful measures of the effectiveness of a
Biological Response Plan? Our model was able to evaluate one—Emergency Department
bed capacity. We considered exploring in the future patient length of stay, staffing,
mortality and the admission and discharge process. Are these indicators adequate or
would others be necessary and more appropriate? Is it possible to create a standard
evaluation matrix based on computer simulation modeling research by which we can
measure the effectiveness of other hospital emergency response plans?

•

Finally, what about the unknown “butterfly flap” in complexity theory? Random shocks
built into the simulation may provide clues as to how much environmental complexity an
organization can take.

Future work can center on these and other important questions. Because the initial model
of the Emergency Department has largely been built and validated, we have an excellent starting
point. We also have substantial data on our current scenario to continue to review and explore, so
we can anticipate using this data for a long time. This promises to be valuable, ground-breaking
work having its roots in theory but proving itself a practical tool for hospital administrators,
clinicians, emergency managers and the public. In today’s complex world full of potential
terrorist threats, it can prove itself vital to emergency preparations.
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APPENDIX A: EVALUATION OF BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE PLAN: DISCRETE
EVENT MODEL DESCRIPTION AND VALIDATION
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Florida Hospital, Winter
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Emergency Department
Evaluation of
Bioterrorism Response Plan
Discrete Event Model
Description and Validation
ENS Robert (Jake) Bebber, USN
UCF College of Health and Public Affairs

Carl M. Anglesea, M.S., CSMP
UCF Institute for Simulation & Training

WPH Emergency Department
Evaluation of Bioterrorism Response Plan
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WPH Emergency Department
Patient Arrival Data:
Seasonal and Hourly Variation

Radar Chart of Patient Visits/Hour
(January 2006)

Radar Chart of Patient Visits/Hour
(May 2006)
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Additional Model Input:
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WPH Emergency Department

WPH ED Model Validation
• Stochastic model of patient arrival and processing sequences:
• Run length: 30 days due to incubation period and public reaction
• Replications: 30 runs for each set of monthly data (May and January)
• Model Validation: Comparison of simulated patients to real patients
• Patient Arrivals:
• Modeled using a Poisson probability distribution
• Same mean arrival rates (hourly and seasonal variations)
• Same arrival mode percentages (ambulance vs. walk-in)
• Patient Processing Sequences:
•Same patient complaint percentages (chest pain, abdominal, etc.)
•Same patient processing and storage times
•Same patient length of stay experienced
•Same patient admission/discharge rates
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Bioterrorism Response Plan Summary
 Infection Control Practitioner (ICP) identifies

issue, notifies local health department


WPMH lacks ICP

 Contact precautions initiated (standard,

enhanced)
 Local health department controls
communication
 Hospital initiates Mass Casualty procedures


Charge Nurse, ED Physician, Administrator
determine staff needs and resource needs

Bioterrorism Response Plan Summary
 Health Unit Coordinator (HUC) ensures stretchers

and wheelchairs brought to ED
 ED is divided into Red, Yellow and Green areas
 Triage station outside at loading ramp directs patients
based on condition to areas for treatment
 Expedited discharge procedures initiated to free beds
in the hospital; non-critical patients are discharged
from ED or moved to Observation
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Inhalation Anthrax
 Symptoms
 Non-specific flu like symptoms including fever,
dyspnea, malaise, fatigue, headache, vomiting, chills
and abdominal discomfort. Person may also have nonproductive cough and mild chest discomfort.
 These symptoms may be followed by a brief period
(several hours to a couple days) of improvement
followed by an abrupt onset of respiratory distress with
dyspnea, diaphoresis, stridor (high pitched whistling
respiration) and cyanosis. Septicemia, shock and
death occur within 24-36 hours after onset of
respiratory distress and mortality approaches 100%.
Approximately 50% of cases develop hemorrhagic
meningitis.

Inhalation Anthrax
 Diagnosis


Presumptive diagnosis based on respiratory
failure with widening mediastinum. (Note –
the onset of initial flu like symptoms will likely
not be considered as anthrax when patients
present to the ED. It will only be after patients
begin to exhibit the effects of respiratory
failure with widening mediastinum that anthrax
becomes a suspect.)
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Inhalation Anthrax
 Note also that the incubation period for

inhaled anthrax is on average, 1-6 days, up to
6 weeks. Patients presenting with anthrax
could come as late as a month away from
exposure.
 Treatment


Early antibiotic treatment is critical to survival.
Antibiotics include Ciprofloxacin, Penicillin G,
Doxycycline.

Why Inhalation Anthrax?
 Common scenario found in the literature is

mass exposure to inhalation anthrax
dispersed in aerosol form via crop dusting
plane
 Presents as flu-like symptoms, making
diagnosis problematic if attack goes
unnoticed
 Non-contagious; does not require isolation
 Treatable with antibiotics
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Data
 Emergency Department Summary Data for January

2006 and May 2006



January represents a “high volume” month
May represents a “low volume” month

 Staff data provided by Emergency Department Nurse

Manager


Staff units include: ED Physician, ED PA, Nurse, Nurse
Technician and Health Unit Coordinator

 Lean Track Program Study of July 2005
 Disaster Drill Assessments

Scenarios
 Advance Warning
 WPMH receives a warning from the local health
department that there has been a bioterror attack using
inhalational anthrax.
 Emergency Department has approximately 30 minutes
to prepare for incoming patients.
 Emergent Discovery
 Patients who do not realize they have been exposed
begin presenting to the ED with anthrax symptoms.
 Discovery time can vary; mortality rate affected.
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Advance Warning Scenario
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40

50

Emergent Discovery Scenario
 Bed capacity use is the same as the Advance

Warning Scenario
 Based on the literature, we can anticipate that
the lack of a syndrome surveillance
monitoring program will mean that an anthrax
outbreak will not be detected for 3.7 to 4.6
days after the release of spores1
1. Buckeridge, D. L., Owens, D. K., Switzer, P., Frank, J., & Musen, M. A. (2006). Evaluating detection of an
inhalational anthrax outbreak. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 12(12), 1942-1949.

Discussion
 WPMH Bioterrorism Response Plan shows great flexibility
 In some cases, the facility is able to handle up to a 50%

increase in patient flow due to the influx of “worried well”


Conversely, staff should monitor carefully and be
prepared with contingencies

 Relying on clinical case findings rather than syndrome

surveillance will likely delay discovery of an anthrax outbreak
when attack is unknown. This will almost certainly lead to
greater patient mortality.
 It is critical for WPMH to be able to manage the “worried well”.
Public response has to be communicated immediately and
effectively through the Health Department.
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Future Work
 Impact of Response Plan on Patient Length

of Stay (LOS)
 Optimization of Emergency Staffing
 Patient mortality rates in the Emergent
Discovery Scenario
 Analysis of the admissions process during
emergencies

Questions?

Thank You!
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APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO SPECULATION
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Inhalational anthrax presents unique challenges to health care providers and
administrators. Yet other potential contagions also represent significant obstacles to overcome.
Smallpox has the ability to spread rapidly across a region, along with plague for example. This
rapid spreading of infection would most certainly have significant consequences for health care
facilities. We can suggest that many hospitals would become overwhelmed. Systems might not
survive the additional shock regardless of their ability to withstand environmental shock.

Bed Capacity

Smallpox / Plague

Inhalational Anthrax

Time

Our data estimates that the Winter Park facility would be able to handle the additional
patient load due to its ability to adapt to system shock. But we have to consider the possibility
that some shocks cannot be withstood over time without additional capacity or diverting
additional load to other sites.

109

LIST OF REFERENCES
Aguirre, B., Dynes, R. R., Kendra, J., & Connell, R. (2005). Institutional resilience and disaster
planning for new hazards: Insights from hospitals. Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, 2(2), 1-17.
Alexander, G. C., & Wynia, M. K. (2003). Ready and willing? Physicians' sense of preparedness
for bioterrorism. Health Affairs, 22(5), 189-197.
Alexopolous, C., Goldsman, D., Fontanesi, J., Sawyer, M., Guire, M. D., Kopald, D., et al.
(2001). A discrete-event simulation application for clinics serving the poor. Paper
presented at the 2001 Winter Simulation Conference.
Anderson, J. G., Harshbarger, W., Weng, H. C., Jay, S. J., & Anderson, M. M. (2002). Modeling
the costs and outcomes of cardiovascular surgery. Health Care Management Science,
5(2), 103-111.
Appelbaum, A. (2002). Meeting the major threats to hospital security within a budget. Journal of
Healthcare Protection Management, 18(1), 38-48.
Appleby, C. (1996). Ka-boom! Hospitals and Health Networks, 70, 30-32.
Arterburn, T. (2002). What hospital security should be doing now to better prepare for future
terrorist activity. Journal of Healthcare Protection Management, 18(1), 6-14.
ASHP. (2003). Ashp statement on the role of health system pharmacists in emergency
preparedness. American Journal of Health System Pharmacists, 60, 1993-1995.
Ashton, R., Hague, L., Brandreth, M., Worthington, D., & Cropper, S. (2005). A simulationbased study of a nhs walk-in centre. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 56(2),
153-161.

110

Bain, J. S., & Quills, D. (1987). Introduction and economic theory concerning industrial
organization. In S. B. Bacharach (Ed.), Industrial organization: A treatise. Greenwich,
Connecticut: JAI Press.
Bar-Yam, Y. (2006). Improving the effectivenss of health care and public health: A multiscale
complex systems analysis. American Journal of Public Health, 96(3), 459-466.
Beech, M. F. (2004). Observing al qaeda through the lens of complexity theory:
Recommendations for the national strategy to defeat terrorism. Center for Strategic
Leadership: Student Issue Paper, S04-01.
Begun, J. W., & Jiang, H. J. (2002). Changing organizations for the likely mass-casualties future.
In J. D. Blair (Ed.), Bioterrorism, preparedness, attack and response. Stamford, CT:
Elsevier Science, Ltd.
Begun, J. W., Zimmerman, B., & Dooley, K. J. (2003). Health care organizations as complex
adaptive systems. In S. S. Mick & W. Mindy E (Eds.), Advances in health care
organization theory. San Francisco, CA: Josey-Bass.
Bell, J., & Seidner, A. G. (2002). Disaster planning for treasury management continuity.
Healthcare Financial Management, 56(8), 92-94.
Bissell, R. A., Pinet, L., Nelson, M., & Levy, M. (2004). Evidence of the effectiveness of health
sector preparedness in disaster response: The example of four earthquakes. Family and
Community Health, 27(3), 193-203.
Blake, J. T., Carter, M. W., & Richardson, S. (1996). An analysis of emergency room wait-time
issues via computer simulation. INFOR, 34(4), 263-272.

111

Borgundvaag, B., Ovens, H., Goldman, B., Schull, M., Rutledge, T., Boutis, K., et al. (2004).
Sars outbreak in the greater toronto area: The emergency department experience. Journal
of the Canadian Medical Association, 171(11), 1342-1344.
Braun, B. I., Wineman, N. V., Finn, N. L., Barera, J. A., Schmaltz, S. P., & Loeb, J. M. (2006).
Integrating hospitals into community emergency preparedness planning. Annals of
Internal Medicine, 144(11), 799-811.
Bravata, D. M., Sundaram, V., McDonald, K. M., Smith, W. M., Szeto, H., Schleinitz, M. D., et
al. (2004). Evaluating detection and diagnostic decision support systems for bioterrorism
response. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 10(1), 100-108.
Brookmeyer, R., & Blades, N. (2003). Statistical models and bioterrorism: Application to the
U.S. Anthrax outbreak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 98(464), 781788.
Buckeridge, D. L., Owens, D. K., Switzer, P., Frank, J., & Musen, M. A. (2006). Evaluating
detection of an inhalational anthrax outbreak. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 12(12),
1942-1949.
Burstein, J. L. (2006). The myths of disaster education. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 47(1),
50-52.
CDC. (2002). Bioterrorism and emergency readiness: Competencies for all public health
workers. In C. f. D. Control (Ed.).
CDC. (2003). Centers for disease control and prevention - emergency preparedness & response agents: Anthrax.. Retrieved May 15, 2007, from http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/
Clancy, T., & Delaney, C. W. (2005). Complex nursing systems. Journal of Nursing
Management, 13, 192-201.
112

Clarke, J. (2004). The united states, europe and homeland security: Seeing soft security concerns
through a counterterrorist lens. European Security, 13, 117-138.
Cohen, H. W., Gould, R. M., & Sidel, V. W. (2004). The pitfalls of bioterrorism preparedness:
The anthrax and smallpox experiences. American Journal of Public Health, 94(10), 16671670.
Cooper, H., Braye, S., & Geyer, R. (2004). Complexity and interprofessional education. Health
and Social Care, 3(4), 179-189.
Crosby, R. A., Kegler, M. C., & DiClemente, R. J. (2002). Understanding and applying theory in
health promotion practice and research. In R. A. Crosby, M. C. Kegler & R. J.
DiClemente (Eds.), Emerging theories in health promotion practice and research. San
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.
Crouch, B. I. (2002). Role of poison control centers in disaster response planning. American
Journal of Health System Pharmacists, 59, 1159-1163.
CRS. (2004). Small-scale terrorist attacks using chemical and biological agents: An assessment
framework and preliminary comparisons (No. RL32391). Washington DC:
Congressional Research Service.
Dando, M. (2005, November/December 2005). The bioterrorist cookbook. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 34-39.
Dittus, R. S., Klein, R. W., DeBrota, D. J., Dame, M. A., & Fitzgerald, J. F. (1996). Medical
resident work schedules: Design and evaluation by simulation modeling. Management
Science, 42(6), 891-906.
EBRI. (2003). Issue briefs: Employer sponsored coverage in florida, 1996-2002: Employee
Benefit Research Council.
113

EBRI. (2004). Analysis of 1993-2003 current population surveys: Employee Benefit Research
Institute.
Falgoust, D. L. (2002). Hospital security over the years: Keeping up with the changes. Journal of
Healthcare Protection Management, 18(2), 115-122.
FDOH. (2005). State of florida recommended core competencies for hospitals. In F. D. o. Health
(Ed.).
Feinendegen, L., & Neumann, R. (2006). The issue of risk in complex adaptive systems: The
case of low-does radiation induced cancer. Human & Experimental Technology, 25, 1117.
FHA. (2004). Challenges facing florida hospitals, FHA Annual Meeting. Orlando, Florida:
Florida Hospital Association.
Fisher, J. D., & Fisher, W. A. (2002). The information-motivation-behavioral skills model. In R.
J. DiClemente, R. A. Crosby & M. C. Kegler (Eds.), Emerging theories in health
promotion practice and research. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.
Fisher, W. A., & Fisher, J. D. (in press). The information-motivation-behavioral skills model as a
genearl model of health behavior change. In J. Suls & K. Wallston (Eds.), Social
psychological functions of health. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell.
Fitch, J. P., Raber, E., & Imbro, D. (2003). Technology challenges in responding to biological or
chemical attacks in the civilian sector. Science, 302(5649), 1350-1355.
Flynn, S. E. (2004). The neglected home front. Foreign Affairs, 83(5), 20-34.
Foldy, S. L., Biedrzycki, P. A., Baker, B. K., Swain, G. R., Howe, D. S., Gieryn, D., et al.
(2004). The public health dashboard: A surveillance model for bioterrorism preparedness.
Journal of Public Health Management & Practice, 10(3), 234-240.
114

Franck, R. E., & Melese, F. (2004). Exploring the structure of terrorists' wmd decisions: A game
theory approach. Defense & Security Analysis, 20(4), 355-372.
Gabel, B., & Sullivan, D. (2007). Meeting with barbara gabel, ma bsn cen, director of emergency
services, winter park memorial hospital & diane sullivan, anm bsn. In R. J. Bebber (Ed.)
(pp. Meeting). Winter Park, Florida.
GAO. (2003). Hospital preparedness: Most urban hospitals have emergency plans but lack
certain capacities for bioterrorism response. In U. S. G. A. Office (Ed.).
Glick, D. F., Jerome-D'Emilia, B., Nolan, M. A., & Burke, P. (2004). Emergency preparedness:
One community's response. Family and Community Health, 27(3), 266-273.
Globalsecurity.org. (2007). Weapons of mass destruction - biological weapons delivery:
Globalsecurity.org.
Gonzalez, J. C. (2002). Delivering security in today's new threat environments. Journal of
Healthcare Protection Management, 18(2), 35-38.
Gonzalez, J. C. (2004). Bio-terrorism, dirty bombs, hospitals and security issues. Journal of
Healthcare Protection Management, 20(2), 55-59.
Greenberg, D. S. (2002). USA expands homeland health security. The Lancet, 359, 237.
Hardin, C. K., & D'Amore, A. R. (2005). Air force expeditionary medical support unit at the
houston floods: Use of a military model in civilian disaster response. Military Medicine,
170(2), 103-108.
Harrison, J. P. (2005). The growing importance of disaster medical response (pp. 11): University
of North Florida.
Haugh, R. (2004). A true picture of what ails your emergency department. Hospitals and Health
Networks, March, 66-70.
115

Hawkins, R., Gaglione, M. M., LaDuca, T., Laung, C., Sample, L., Gliva-McConvey, G., et al.
(2004). Assessment of patient management skills and clinical skills of practising doctors
computer-based cause simulations and standardised patients. Medical Education, 38, 958968.
Health. (2005). Florida disaster response plan for hospitals: Bombs, burns and blasts component.
In D. o. Health (Ed.).
Heffler, S., Smith, S., Keehan, S., Clemens, M. K., Zezza, M., & Truffer, C. (2004). Health
spending projections through 2013. Health Affairs, Jan.-Jun.(W4), 79-93.
Helde, E. A. d. (2006). The importance of evidence-based disaster planning. Annals of
Emergency Medicine, 47(1), 34-49.
Hendrickson, R. G. (2005). Terrorist chemical release: Assessment of medical risk and
implications for emergency preparedness. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 11(3),
487-499.
Hospital, F. (2002a). Florida hospital bioterrorism response plan. Orlando, Florida: Florida
Hospital.
Hospital, F. (2002b). Mass casualty / disaster plan (Policy & Procedure No. 155.072.1).
Orlando, Florida: Florida Hospital.
Huser, T. J. (2004). Jcaho changes to the environment of care chapter for 2004. Journal of
Healthcare Protection Management, 20(1), 67-73.
IOM. (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st century: Institute of
Medicine.
Iserson, K. V. (2001). Demon doctors: Physicians as serial killers. Tucson, AZ: Galen Press,
Ltd.
116

JCAHO. (2003). Health care at the crossroads: Strategies for creating and sustaining communitywide emergency preparedness systems. In J. C. o. A. o. H. Organizations (Ed.).
Kabsai, D., & Kare, J. (2002). Prehospital disaster management: Implications for weapons of
mass destruction. Topics in Emergency Medicine, 24(3), 37-43.
Kaiser/HRET. (2004). Employer health benefits annual survey.
Katz, A., Staiti, A. B., & McKenzie, K. L. (2006). Preparing for the unknown, responding to the
known: Communities and public health preparedness. Health Affairs, 25(4), 946-957.
Kelton, W. D., Sadowski, R. P., & Sadowski, D. A. (2002). Simulation with arena (2nd ed.).
Boston: McGraw Hill.
Kicklighter, L. (2001). Safety and security. In R. Carroll (Ed.), Risk management handbook for
health care organizations (Third Edition ed., pp. 938). San Francisco, California: JosseyBass.
Kleinman, K. P., Abrams, A., Mandl, K., & Platt, R. (2005). Simulation for assessing statistical
methods of biologic terrorism surveillance. MMWR, 54 (Supp), 101-108.
Kovel, J. P. (2000). Modeling disaster response planning. Journal of Urban Planning and
Development, 126(1), 26-38.
Krizner, K. (2002). The enemy within: Bioterror forces new contingency plans to better
coordinate resources and information to contain and minimize an outbreak. Managed
Healthcare Executive, 12(5), 28-32.
Krosnick, J. A., & Petty, R. E. (1993). Attitude strength: An overview. In R. E. Petty & J. A.
Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences. Hillsdale, New Jersey:
Erlbaum.

117

Kumar, A., & Shim, S. (2005). Using computer simulation for surgical care process
reengineering in hospitals. INFOR, 43(4), 303-319.
Lansing, J. S. (2003). Complex adaptive systems. Annual Review of Anthropology, 32, 183-204.
Law, A. M., & Kelton, W. D. (2000). Simulation modeling and analysis (3rd ed.). Boston:
McGraw Hill.
Leiba, A., Goldberg, A., Hourvitz, A., Amsalem, Y., Aran, A., Weiss, G., et al. (2006). Lessons
learned form clinical anthrax drills: Evaluation of knowledge and preparedness for a
bioterrorist threat in israeli emergency departments. Annals of Emergency Medicine,
48(1), 194-199.
Levy, D. (1994). Chaos theory and strategy: Theory, application and managerial implications.
Strategic Management Journal, 15, 167-178.
Lovern, E. (2001). Whatever the number, it's big. Modern Healthcare, 31(45), 6-7.
Luizzo, A. J., & Scaglione, B. (2004). How has hospital security changed since 9/11? Journal of
Healthcare Protection Management, 20(2), 44-48.
Luke, R. D., & Walston, S. L. (2003). Strategy in an institutional environment. In S. S. Mick &
M. E. Wittenbach (Eds.), Advances in health care organization theory. San Francisco,
California: Jossey-Bass.
Malanson, G. P. (1999). Considering complexity. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, 89(4), 746-753.
Markenson, D., Reily, M. J., & DiMaggio, C. (2005). Public health department training of
emergency medical technicians for bioterrorism and public health emergencies: Results
of a national assessment. Journal of Public Health Management & Practice, November
(Supp), S68-S74.
118

Masterson, B. J., Mihara, T. G., Miller, G., Randolph, S. C., Forkner, M. E., & Crouter, A. L.
(2004). Using models and data to support optimization of the military health system: A
case study in an intensive care unit. Health Care Management Science, 7, 217-224.
McDaniel, R. (2004). Chaos and complexity in a bioterrorism future. In J. D. Blair, M. D. Fottler
& A. C. Zapanta (Eds.), Advances in health care management (Vol. 5, pp. 119-139).
Stamford, CT: JAI.
McEntire, D. A. (2002). Coordinating mutli-organizational responses to disaster: Lessons from
the march 28, 2000, fort worth tornado. Disaster Prevention and Management, 11(5),
369-379.
Medicine, I. o. (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st century.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Centralization and legitimacy problems of local
governments. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363.
Murphy, J. K. (2004). After 9/11: Priority focus areas for bioterrorism preparedness in hospitals.
Journal of Healthcare Management, 49(4), 227-235.
Olney, C. A. (2005). Using evaluation to adapt health information outreach to the complex
environments of community-based organizations. Journal of the Medical Library
Association, 93(4), S57-S67.
Parker, J. (1995). Sourcing security. HD: The Journal for Healthcare Design and Development,
26(7), 26-28.
Pasin, F., Jobin, M.-H., & Cordeau, J.-F. (2002). An application of simulation to analyse
resource sharing among health-care organizations. Internation Journal of Operations &
Production Management, 22(4), 381-393.

119

Pavin, J. A., Mostasheri, F., Kortepeter, M. G., Hynes, N. A., Chotani, R. A., Mikol, Y. B., et al.
(2003). Innovative surveillance methods for rapid detection of disease outbreaks and
bioterrorism: Results of an interagency workshop on health indicator surveillance.
American Journal of Public Health, 93(8), 1230-1235.
Pennington, H. (2003). Smallpox and bioterrorism. Bulletin of the World Health Organization,
81(10), 762-767.
Perry, R., & Lindell, M. (2006). Hospital planning for weapons of mass destruction incidents.
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine, 52(2), 116-120.
Petty, R. E., Barden, J., & Wheeler, S. C. (2002). The elaboration likelihood model of
persuasion: Health promotions that yeild sustained behavioral change. In R. J.
DiClemente, R. A. Crosby & M. C. Kegler (Eds.), Emerging theories in health promotion
practice and research. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence
perspective. New York, New York: Harper and Row.
Porte, T. M. L. (2005, October 1, 2005). Governance and the specter of infrastructure collapse.
Paper presented at the 8th National Public Management Research Conference, University
of Southern California.
Pritsker, A. A. B., & O'Reilly, J. J. (1999). Simulation with vusual slam and awesim (Second
ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Relyea, H. C. (2003). Organizing for homeland security. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33(3),
602-624.
Roll, F. G. (2002). Is healthcare security prepared for terrorism? Journal of Healthcare
Protection Management, 18(1), 1-5.
120

Rossetti, M. D., Trzcinski, G. F., & Syverud, S. A. (1999). Emergency department simulation
and determination of optimal attending physician staffing schedules. Paper presented at
the 1999 Winter Simulation Conference.
Rouse, W. B. (2000). Managing complexity: Disease control as a complex adaptive system.
Information, Knowledge, Systems Management, 2, 143-165.
Saliba, D., Buchanan, J., & Kington, R. S. (2004). Function and response of nursing facilities
during community disaster. American Journal of Public Health, 94(8), 1436-1441.
Samet, D. H. (2005). Maintain a safe environment of care. Nursing Management, 36(1), 12-13.
Scharoun, K. (2005). The influences of system affiliation, size, and location on bioterrorism
preparedness among florida hospitals. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Central
Florida, Orlando, FL.
Scherer, F. M., & Ross, D. (1990). Industrial market structure and economic performance.
Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin.
Security. (2006). The national security strategy of the united states. In W. House (Ed.).
Sinreich, D., & Marmor, Y. (2005). Emergency department operations: The basis for developing
a simulation tool. IIE Transactions, 37, 233-243.
Sisson, M. (2002). Bioterror fears forcing hospitals to prep together. Crain's New York Business,
18(34), 17.
Smethurst, D. P., & Williams, H. C. (2001). Are hospital waiting lists self regulating? Nature,
410, 652-653.
Stahl, J. E., Rattner, D., Wiklund, R., Lester, J., Beinfeld, M., & Gazelle, G. S. (2004).
Reorganizing the system of care surrounding laparoscopic surgery: A cost-effectiveness
analysis using discrete-event simulation. Medical Decision Making, 24, 461-471.
121

State. (2003). National strategy for combating terrorism. In D. o. State (Ed.).
Steward, D., & Wan, T. T. H. (2006). The role of simulation and modeling in disaster
management (pp. 9): University of Central Florida.
Streichert, L. C., O'Carroll, P. W., Gordon, P. R., Stevermer, A. C., Turner, A. M., & Nicola, R.
M. (2005). Using problem-based learning as a strategy for cross-disipline in emergency
preparedness training. Journal of Public Health Management & Practice, November
(Supp), S95-S99.
Su, S., & Shih, C.-L. (2003). Modeling an emergency medical services system using computer
simulation. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 72, 57-72.
Tan, J., Wen, H. J., & Awad, N. (2005). Health care and services delivery systems as complex
adaptive systems. Communications of the ACM, 48(5), 36-44.
Thacher, D. (2005). The local role in homeland security. Law & Security Review, 39(3), 635676.
Unknown. (2000). Hospital security has key role in upping hospital's market share. Hospital
Security and Safety Management, 21(4), 1-3.
Unknown. (2001a). Dealing with problem number one - budget cuts, can you afford to do more
with less? Hospital Security and Safety Management, 22(5), 5-9.
Unknown. (2001b). Meeting the major threats to hospital security within budget. Hospital
Security and Safety Management, 22(2), 9-11.
Unknown. (2002). The rise in bomb threats: How should hospital security respond? Hospital
Security and Safety Management, 22(9), 1-3.
Vecchio, A. (2000). Plan for the worst before disaster strikes. Health Management Technology,
21(6), 28-30.
122

Vogt, E. M. (2002). Effective communication of drug safety information to patients and the
public. Drug Safety, 25(5), 313-321.
Wan, T. T. H. (2002). Evidence-based health care management. Boston, Massachusetts: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Wan, T. T. H., & Connell, A. M. (2003). Monitoring the quality of health care: Issues and
scientific approaches. Boston, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Wattanawaituechai, C., Peacock, S. J., & Jitpratoom, P. (2005). Tsunami in thailand - disaster
management in a district hospital. New England Journal of Medicine, 352(10), 962-964.
Weinstein, N. D., Rothman, A., & Sutton, S. (1998). Stage theories of health behavior. Health
Psychology, 17, 290-299.
Weinstein, N. D., & Sandman, P. M. (2002). The precaution adoption process model and its
application. In R. J. DiClemente, R. A. Crosby & M. C. Kegler (Eds.), Emergency
theories in health promotion practice and research. San Francisco, California: JosseyBass.
Wetter, D. C., Daniell, W. E., & Treser, C. D. (2001). Hospital preparedness for victims of
chemical or biological terrorism. American Journal of Public Health, 91(5), 710-716.
White, D. E. (2002). A terrorism response plan for hospital security and safety officers. Journal
of Healthcare Protection Management, 18(1), 15-23.
William L. Waugh, J. (2003). Terrorism, homeland security and the national emergency
management network. Public Organization Review, 3, 373-385.
Zimmerman, B. (1999). Complexity science: A route through hard times. Health Forum Journal,
42-49.

123

Zinkovich, L., Malvey, D., Hamby, E., & Fottler, M. (2005). Bioterror events: Preemptive
strategies for healthcare executives. HOSPITAL TOPICS: Research and Perspectives on
Healthcare, 83(3), 9-15.

124

